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Abstract 
 
This dissertation is going to study the determinants of capital structure of 
firms in Japan. As previous empirical researches, they all pointed out the 
factors in different countries. Therefore, it is going to carry out the empirical 
research in Japanese firms. The sample data used in this dissertation is from 
a panel data set of 193 non-financial companies in the NIKKIE 225 during 
the periods from 2003 to 2013. Firstly, it presents MM theory and two mainly 
modern theories which are the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory. 
According to these theories, it finds some factors from our sample data. 
Then, the one-way ANOVA approach is applied. The results from ANOVA 
approach show that the industry classification is one of the determinants of 
capital structure. Moreover, it has applied the fixed effects model for the 
sample data to find out the other determinants. The results show that 
non-debt tax shield, size, growth opportunity, tangible assets and 
profitability are considered as determinants of capital structure of Japanese 
firms. And the liquidity needs more argument due to the insignificant result. 
In general, it cannot have a convincing theory to explain the behaviour of 
financing capital structure of Japanese firms. The most likely theory to follow 
in Japanese firms is the trade-off theory. In fact, it can guess that dynamic 
trade-off theory might be the most appropriate. The answer for this theory 
should be considered in the further study. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background overview 
 
As Richard, Myers and Franklin (2008) state, capital structure can be 
considered that a firm mixes the debt and equity to finance its fund. In order 
to raise finance from the market, it has to dilute ownership more than the 
firm would like to do. It means that it has to adjust the capital structure to its 
optimal level. This problem was considered as an important and notable 
issues in the past. The purpose for many studies is finding the optimal point 
of capital structure with mixing the debt and equity so that minimize the cost 
of financing capital structure. Moreover, many literatures also have studied 
what the determinants of the optimal debt equity combination.  
 
The basic framework is developed by Modigliani and Miler (1958, 1963) in 
1958 and 1963. They make assumption with the market as a perfect market. 
It means that it no transaction costs, no agency costs, no bankruptcy costs, 
no taxes and no private information in the market. In such assumption, they 
developed two main propositions. As Richard, Myers and Franklin 
summarize (2008), pURSRVLWLRQRQHLVVD\LQJWKDWILUP¶VYDOXHLVQRWDIIHFWHG
by leverage. Proposition two merely states that the return you can expect 
from equity goes up with debt to equity ratio and gives the relationship 
between the two. However, the basic framework has not discussed complex 
situation which the market has agency costs, cost of financial distress, taxes 
and private information. Hence, the further discussion for other researchers 
is going to find out the answer under real market. 
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The mainly theories of capital structure are the trade-off theory and the 
pecking order theory. Both of the theories are released the strict assumption 
in the market and discuss the optimal capital structure and find out what the 
determinants affect the capital structure. In the trade-off theory, it mainly 
discusses the relationship between agency cost and cost of financial distress 
and debt to equity ratio. The trade-off theory describes the optimal point of 
mixing the advantages of debt and cost of debt. However, Brealey, Myers 
and Allen (2008) argue the theory does not consider the stock market effect 
in debt equity ratio (Brealey R. A. et. al., 2008). Furthermore, the pecking 
order theory focused on asymmetric information more than cost of financial 
distress. This theory also considers how the agency cost affects the capital 
structure. In the pecking order theory, it assumes that firms prefer to 
retained earnings than external finance. Moreover, in external finance, firms 
prefer debt than equity. Both of the theories are discussed in previous 
research. And both of researches have pointed out how and what different 
determinants affect the capital structure under broad assumptions of the 
market. 
 
In this study, the mainly discussion focuses on these two theories and find 
out the determinants factors of capital structure choice by using Japanese 
firms. Many previous empirical studies were studying the same topic by 
using different countries. Ozkan (2001) does his study by using UK company 
panel data. His investigation has provided an inside view of corporate 
borrowing from UK companies. The results show that the company has a 
target of debt ratio and they adjust their target very quickly according to the 
market. Moreover, Huang and Song (2005) do their research by using 
Chinese companies. It finds out some differences in determinants of capital 
structure because of the different market. They try to explain the different 
features in the capital structure of Chinese companies. The differences 
might be the different accounting principles and different behaviours from 
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the managers. Furthermore, Miguel and Pindado (2001) find new evidence 
of determinants of capital structure from Spanish panel data. They find out 
a different relationship between the determinants and leverage from 
Spanish companies. They explain the reason for differences according to the 
trade-off theory.  
 
Therefore, this study is trying to discuss and find out some evidence from 
Japanese panel data following the former empirical researches. It is sensible 
to carry out the determinants of capital structure by using different 
FRXQWULHV¶GDWDEHFDXVHLWFDQKDYHQHZUHVXOWVDQGHQODUJHWKLVLPSRUWDQW
topic. 
1.2 Research Objective 
 
The object of this study is trying to find out the significant determinants of 
the Japanese firms by using a panel data. The panel data are from the 
NIKKIE 225 which is an index from Japan. The 225 numbers of companies 
can represent most of the companies and industries in Japan. The sample 
data is yearly accounting data from the first of January in 2003 to the first of 
January in 2013 which includes 10 years. Hence, it is believable that the 
sample data can be represented for all the companies in Japan. To be more 
specific, the objects can be described as three mainly points, 
 
Firstly, what are the significant determinants in Japanese companies?  
 
Secondly, how do the determinants affect the capital structure? 
 
Thirdly, which theories is the most appropriate in explaining the capital 
structure of Japanese firm? 
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In order to answer these three problems, this study is going to present the 
basic theories and do empirical research for Japanese panel data. Moreover, 
it is trying to explain the determinants according to different theories. Finally, 
it can find out the appropriate theory to explain the financial behaviour of 
Japanese corporations. 
 
1.3 The structure of dissertation 
 
This dissertation is organized as follows. In chapter 2, it is going to review 
the previous theories of capital structure, which are included the Modigliani 
and Miller irrelevance theory, the trade-off theory and the pecking order 
theory. Chapter 3 provides some factors discussed before and moreover, it is 
to identify the factors of capital structure in this study according to different 
theories. Chapter 4 presents the data collected for this study and the 
empirical methodology according to previous studies and financial 
Econometrics. Chapter 5 is about the results from the methodology and 
having some discussion about the estimated resulted. Finally, in Chapter 6, 
it has a conclusion and furthermore, it presents some limitations in order to 
have a further discussion in the future. 
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2. Literature review 
 
2.1 Modigliani-Miler theorem 
 
Richard, Myers and Franklin (2008) summarize that Modigliani-Miler 
theorem is a starting point and provides a framework to do research in the 
capital structure. Two propositions are present in the theory by Modigliani 
and Miler in the 1958 which shows the payout policy does not matter in the 
prefect markets, also shows that financial decisions do not matter in prefect 
markets, too (Richard A. B. et. al, 2008). In other words, Modigliani-Miler 
theory (MM theory) considers that with fixed investment decisions, it is 
irrelevant with the capital structure of a firm. In the previous empirical 
works of MM theory, all the researches were under some strict assumptions. 
,Q :LOOLDP 6FRWW DQG /DZUHQFH¶V  VWXG\ Whe assumptions can 
conclude as two big points. The first one is the cash flow is perpetual; it 
means that it is zero growth opportunities. The second one is prefect market 
which is no taxes, no transaction costs, perfect competition in the market, 
and the same rate for the firms and investors borrow/lend and equal access 
to all relevant information. 
 
In the next section, it is going to discuss the MM theory in two conditions. In 
the early beginning, Modigliani and Miler considered the financing of capital 
structure was without taxes. However, in the later time, they argued that the 
financing of capital structure was with taxes. Therefore, it is necessary to 
discuss the MM theory in two conditions. 
 
12 
 
2.1.1 Modigliani-Miler theorem without taxes 
 
2.1.1.1 Proposition 1: 
 
Modigliani-Miler theorem without taxes is basic and original framework 
provided by Modigliani and Miler. Under the assumptions of MM theory, the 
investors can duplicate the earning of firm under any capital structure. It 
means that investors can find the capital structure with any leverage finance. 
Therefore, it cannot create extra value for the shareholders with adopting a 
particular capital structure. As William (200&) summarize, proposition one 
asserts that under perfect market, the total market value of a firm is equal 
to the value of its assets and the firm value is not affected by leverage. 
Moreover, the value of its assets is measured by the present value of the 
cash flows generated by the assets (William L. M. et. al.: 2007). Ross, 
Westerfield and Jaffe (2008) conclude the proposition one into one simple 
and straightforward equation, which is  
VL=VU. 
It means that the market value of a leveraged firm which is standing for VL 
it the same with the market value of an unleveraged firm which is VU in the 
equation.  
 
The basic behaviour of a firm whenever they would issue equity or debt is 
borrowing a fund from the market or selling an ownership to market. In the 
light of perfect market, the firm does not enjoy any counter-advantage 
comparing with an individual when the firm is undertaking leverage. The 
reason is both of the firm and individuals can borrow or lend at the same rate 
from market (Richard A. B. et. al, 2008). It means that it is no arbitrage 
opportunities in the transactions. Therefore, it is no additional value of 
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issuing debt or selling equity. 
 
As proposition one has been discussed before, the key point it can 
emphasize is that under the assumptions, whether a company use a 
leverage or not will not impact the total market value. In other words, it is no 
matter for the value of firm with any financial assets with debt and equity 
(Fischer E. et. al, 1989, Richard A. B. et. al, 2008, William L. M. et. al, 2007) 
 
2.1.1.2 Proposition 2: 
 
0RGLJOLDQLDQG0LOHUHVWDEOLVKHGLQSURSRVLWLRQRQHWKDWDILUP¶VGHEW-equity 
ratio is irrelevant to its market value. Moreover, they further considered the 
choice about the debt-equity ratio. It is what we are known in proposition 
two. As William, Scott and Lawrence (2007) explain in 2007, the proposition 
two states that the use of financial leverage increases the risk and return to 
shareholders. In the literature written by Jonathan and Peter (2011), they 
conclude WKH SURSRVLWLRQ WZR DV ³WKH FRVW RI FDSLWal of levered equity 
LQFUHDVHVZLWKWKHILUP¶VPDUNHWYDOXHGHEW-HTXLW\UDWLR .´ Considered the 
firm as a portfolio combined debt with equity, the return on the assets of 
firms is equal to the weighted average of the returns on debt and equity. It 
is known as follows, 
rU=(
୉୚)rE+(ୈ୚)rD 
Rearranging the above equation, it can get, 
rE= ru +(
ୈ୉)(ru- rD) 
Where are means the return on levered equity, ru is the return on unlevered 
equity, D stands for the value of debt, E is the value of equity, rD is the cost 
of debt. 
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In the equation, it implies that the return on equity is equal to the return on 
assets. Moreover, as debt is increasing, the return on equity is increasing as 
well. When a firm replaces debts for equity, it is obvious that it is replacing 
a high cost source of finance with a low cost one by holding more risks. In 
other words, leverage increases the risk and return to shareholders even 
though the cost of debt is less than the cost of capital. However, it is no net 
benefit for a firm to do this because the rate at which the cost of equity 
increases exactly offsets the decrease in the cost of funds for replacing 
equity with debt and WACC will be held the same as before. The proposition 
two is merely stating the return which can expect from equity goes up with 
the debt-equity ratio, and provides a relationship between the two (Seth A.: 
2005). The proposition two, which is that the rising cost of equity 
accompanies a higher debt-HTXLW\ UDWLR DQG OHDYHV D ILUP¶V :$&&
unchanged, can be shown as graph 1 below,  
 
GARPY 1: MM proposition two Illustrated (William L. M. et. al., 2007) 
 
2.1.2 Modigliani-Miler theorem with taxes 
 
Modigliani and Miler (1958) derived the propositions under the assumptions 
that it is no taxes or other transition costs. However, Modigliani and Miler 
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(1963) introduce an important factor, taxes, into their theory. They released 
the assumptions about taxes and discussed how the taxes would impact the 
capital structure. In the world of taxes, corporations can treat interest 
payments to lenders as a tax deductible business expense whereas the 
shareholders do not have such advantage with dividend payment. Obviously, 
it leads benefits from debt because of the tax advantage. In other words, 
firms can issue debt so that it can increase the value of the firm. 
 
Reminding the proposition 1 in MM theory without taxes, it is known that 
VL=VU. Considering in an unleveraged firm, it can modify VU with discount 
after tax income. Supposed TC is the tax rate, rD is the cost of debt, it can get 
the taxable income is EBIT- rDD.  
 
By issuing debt to market, a firm can shield some of its cash flow from 
taxation. Therefore, it can increase the value of the firm. The tax shield can 
be treated as followed, 
PV of interest of tax shield = 
ሺ୘ౙൈ୰ీൈୈሻ୰ీ  
In other words, the advantage of debt is the tax rate times the face value of 
debt outstanding. Therefore, the value of leveraged firm is equal to the value 
of an unleveraged firm plus the PV of interest of the tax shield. It can 
express as, 
VL=VU+PV tax shield 
It should know that the VL and VU is the value of leveraged and unleveraged 
firm with tax 
 
In conclusion of the MM theory with taxes, Ross (2008) points out that 100% 
debt financing of projects is optimal, In other wordVDILUP¶VRSWLPDOFDSLWDO
structure is 100% debt (Ross et. al., 2008). However, it is an unrealistic 
conclusion of the Modigliani - miller theorem with taxes. Modigliani-Miler 
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theorem contributes a basic point and framework to do research in capital 
structure. However, the theory ignored some of the important factors, for 
example, agency cost, bankruptcy cost and so on, in the real world under its 
strict assumptions (Breasley et. al., 2006). Murray and Vidhan (2007) argue 
that a number of important facts are not identified in MM theory. It is 
important to advocate taxes, bankruptcy costs, transaction costs, adverse 
selection and agency conflicts as major explanations for the corporate use of 
debt financing (Murray Z. F., 2007). These ideas are synthesized into 
trade-off theory and pecking order theory. 
 
2.2 Trade-off theory 
 
When the corporate income tax was introduced to the original irrelevant 
propositions, this creates a benefit of leverage from the interest tax shield 
with the costs of financial distress. It is to determine the amount of debt to 
issue so that a firm should maximize its value. The financial distress is an 
important fact to avoid unrealistic 100% debt financing, which is an 
offsetting cost of debt it needed. As Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) state, it 
has a classic statement of the theory that optimal leverage reflects a 
trade-off theory between the tax shield and deadweight costs of bankruptcy 
(Kraus A. et. al., 1973). According to trade-off theory, Myers (1984) explains 
the debt equity ratio target that is set by a firm which followed trade-off 
theory is determined by balancing debt tax shields against the costs of 
bankruptcy. More details, it said that the total value of a leveraged firm 
equals the value of the unleveraged firm plus the present value of the tax 
shield from debt and less the present value of financial distress costs (Myers 
S. C., 1984). It can simply express as follows, 
VL=VU+PV tax shield-PV financial distress costs 
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It is obviously known from the above equation that leverage has costs as 
well as benefit. In order to exploit the benefit of the tax shield, the firm has 
motivation to increase leverage. However, the more debt the firms adopt, 
the more risk they should bear. In the view of Jonathan (2011), with too 
much debt, they are more likely to default risk and incur financial distress 
costs (Jonathan B. et. al., 2011).  
 
2.2.1 Tax shields 
 
Under the discussion of MM theory, higher debt and interest payment can 
have less tax in a world tax system. In general, the interest that 
corporations need to pay can be considered as a tax deductible expense so 
that it can increase WKHILUP¶VYDOXH (Stein F.). As Graham (2003) contributes, 
Miller points out although firms have an incentive to borrow since they have 
a corporate tax advantage, an individual may not find it is optimal to lend to 
the firm (Graham J., 2003). Therefore, it has a conflict between personal tax 
and corporate tax. This is because interest income and dividends/capital 
gains are taxed at different rates. The interest income is taxed at a regular 
income tax rate whereas dividends/capital gains often tax exempt or at a 
lower tax rate. It means that individuals in higher tax brackets would perfect 
equity to debt.  
 
In the view of firms, it would borrow as much as possible from low income 
tax groups in order to have a tax shield whereas individuals would ask for 
higher interest to compensate the higher personal tax groups they are in. 
Thus, it would reduce the tax shield of firm and lead to a limitation of using 
debt. In conclusion, it has a positive relation between using debt and 
corporate tax while negative relation with personal tax. 
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The main theoretical benefit of debt is a tax shield on interest paid on debt 
(Scott J. M., 1976). Some investigators provided many examples to 
illustrate the tax shield on interest paid on debt in many tax systems in the 
world. As stated by Ashton (1989), the tax system in the USA encourages 
firms to report losses for the accounting year forward so that firms have 
ability to receive cash refund of prior taxes or get tax reduction in the future 
(Ashton D. J., 1989). However, in the UK, Adedeji (1988) points out that 
those firms in the UK do not use debt as much as firms in the USA because 
of the imputation tax system (Adedeji A., 1998). In other words, it has 
benefits on tax shield on interest paid on debt but with a different tax system 
in the world, firms in different countries finance their capital structure with 
different leverage. Although it has the main theoretical benefit of debt which 
is tax shield, it also has the main adverse consequence which is the cost of 
financial distress (Scott J. M., 1976). 
 
2.2.2 Financial distress cost 
 
2.2.2.1 Bankruptcy cost 
 
As companies have more debt, the size of the debt obligations is growing. In 
case the firm is not able to meet its debt obligations, the company is facing 
financial distress or declares bankruptcy. It is one of the main adverse 
factors in financial distress cost. Myers (1984) states that for a given level of 
operating income, the higher the level of debt the firms have, the higher 
chance that the firm is unable to meet the obligation. Therefore, while debt 
may have a net advantage, managers have to trade-off this tax advantage 
against the present value of the expected cost of bankruptcy cost (Myers S. 
C., 1984). Obviously, the bankruptcy cost is one of the candidates which are 
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offsetting the cost of debt. According to Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), they 
provide a classic statement of the theory that optimal leverage reflects a 
trade-off between the tax shield of debt and the deadweight costs of 
bankruptcy (Kraus A. et. al., 1973). Since WKH0\HUV¶VWDWHment, it can 
H[SUHVVDOHYHUHGILUP¶VYDOXHDVfollows, 
VL=VU+PV tax shield-PV bankruptcy costs 
 
It is well known that bankruptcy costs include direct and indirect costs of 
bankruptcy (Warner J. B., 1977, William L. M. et. al., 2007, Barclay M. J. et. 
DO7DNLQJ:LOOLDPHWDO¶V(2007) explanation for example, direct 
costs of bankruptcy are out-of-pocket cash expenses directly related to the 
bankruptcy filing and administration, like legal and administrative are the 
costs of the bankruptcy process. Indirect costs are expenses that result from 
bankruptcy but are not a cash expense spent on the process itself, like loss 
of income to the firm because of loss of confidence by consumers (William L. 
M. et. al., 2007). Many studies show how both the direct bankruptcy cost 
and the indirect bankruptcy cost affected the capital structure. In the view of 
GLUHFWEDQNUXSWF\FRVW:DUQHU¶V(1977) empirical research shows that large 
firm would have the motivation to use debt. Relative to the pre-bankruptcy 
market value of a large firm, large firms would have small expected direct 
bankruptcy cost (Warner J. B., 1977). In addition, although indirect 
bankruptcy cost is hard to measure, research showed they are significant.  
 
Many studies show that firms use less debt when they are facing a higher 
expected bankruptcy risk (Myers S. C., 1984, Brealey R. A. et. al., 2008, 
William L. M. et. al., 2007). Firstly, companies with highly variable earnings 
use less debt while firms with more stable profits have tended to use more 
debt. Second, the observed leverage ratios across industries are highly 
correlated to investment opportunities of industries. Generally speaking, if 
firms with capital invest have few growth opportunities, they tend to have a 
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high levered ratio. On the other hand, if firms with high-tech have many 
growth opportunities, they motivate to use less debt. Third, firms will use 
more debt if their assets can go through bankruptcy without losing value 
(William L. M. et. al., 2007). If only considered the bankruptcy cost in capital 
structure, it can be illustrated in the graph 2 below, 
 
GRAPH 2: Capital structure with bankruptcy cost in trade-off theory (Sanjay B., 
2013) 
 
As a tax shield on the debt cannot fulfil with the bankruptcy cost, the firm 
stops borrowing where the value is maximized. 
 
2.2.2.2 Agency cost 
 
Michael and William (1976) present the agency cost of the financial 
VWUXFWXUH$VWKH\REVHUYHGZKHQDQHQWUHSUHQHXURZQVDOORIDFRPSDQ\¶V
stock, the entrepreneur bears all the costs and reaps all the benefits 
(Michael J. et. al., 1976). However, selling stock to outside investors creates 
agency costs of equity that the entrepreneur bears and also harms society 
and discourages additional entrepreneurship. Even though selling stock has 
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such disadvantage, it is essential for entrepreneurs to sell external equity in 
society. Firms pursue growth opportunities and e[SDQGWKHHQWUHSUHQHXU¶V
personal wealth (William L. M. et. al., 2007). Michael and William (1976) 
point out that debt can overcome the agency cost of outside equity. However, 
it also leads to agency cost of debt (Michael J. et. al., 1976). In the model of 
Michael and William (1976), starting from an all equity position, managers 
will sell bonds for stock to reduce the agency costs of equity. As long as 
reducing agency costs of equity, the agency costs of debt are increasing. In 
other words, if it meets a balance between the agency cost of equity and 
agency cost of debt, capital structure could be optimal. Considered in 
trade-RIIWKHRU\QRZLWFDQH[SUHVVDOHYHUHGILUP¶VYDOXHDVDQXQOHYHUHG
ILUP¶VYDOXHPLQXVSUHVHQWYDOXHRIEDQNUXSWF\SOXVDJHQF\FRVWof equity 
minus agency cost of debt. It can be simply expressed as follows (Jonathan 
B. et. al., 2011), 
VL=VU+PV tax shield-PV bankruptcy costs+PV agency cost of equity-PV 
agency cost of debt 
 
 
According to the above equation, the optimal capital structure can describe 
as follows graph 3, 
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GRAPH 3: Optimal capital structure in trade-off theory (Myers S., 1984) 
 
$V+D\QH¶VVWXG\ (1998), the optimal structure is different vary with the 
characteristics of the firm. For example, firm with high research and 
development and more growth opportunities commonly maintain low debt 
levels. In order to have low current cash flows, they need little debt to 
provide a tax shield. Moreover, the agency cost of debt is high. Thus, firms 
such as biotechnology and technology often have low leverage (Hayne E. L., 
1998). In general, debt offers tax advantages so that it reduces the cost of 
issuing debt. However, as long as issuing debt, the bankruptcy cost is 
increasing. It has a bias impact towards equity. Besides, equity is not free 
and it is associated with agency cost. Hence, optimal capital structure has 
three determinants which are tax shield, bankruptcy cost and agency cost. 
 
2.2.3 Limitation of trade-off theory 
 
Although the trade-off theory successfully explains the differences in capital 
structure among different industries, there are still a few unexplained 
regularities cannot explain. Some studies found in the highest profitability 
23 
 
companies have lower debt whereas in the trade-off theory, it suggested 
that it was a positive relationship between profitability and leverage (Ross S. 
A. et. al., 1977, Kester C. W., 1986). Moreover, in the trade-off theory, it 
implied that firms have motivations to use too little debt. However, for 
example in the leverage increasing event, the leverage increase such as 
debt-for-equity exchange offer, it will always increase the stock price. It 
seems that firms will use more debt against the trade-off theory (William L. 
M. et. al., 2007). Mayer (1984) proposes a new theory to illustrate these 
regularities which is known as pecking order theory (Mayer S. C., 1984). 
 
2.3 Pecking order theory 
 
Compared with the trade-off theory, Mayer proposed the pecking order 
WKHRU\$V0\HUV¶H[SODQDWLRQ (1984) ³D ILUP LVVDLG WR IROORZDSHFNLQJ
order if it prefers internal to external financing and debt to equity if external 
financing is used (Mayer S. C., 1984). In other words, it is argued that 
adverse selection implied that retained earnings are better than debt and 
debt is better than equity. This ranking was also motivated with reference to 
the adverse selection model in Myers and Majluf (1984). They provide a 
definition which is that a firm is said to follow a pecking order if it prefer 
internal to external financing and debt to equity if external financing is used 
(Mayer S. C. et. al., 1984). Most firms hold some internal funds such as cash 
or short term investments even they still raise their funds from outside. It is 
obvious that companies can be considered as follows pecking order. The 
pecking order theory is relaxed the assumptions of MM theory and trying to 
develop to explain the optimal capital structure in the modern organization 
system. The pecking order model can be derived based on adverse selection 
considerations and agency considerations. Hence, it is going to discuss 
pecking order theory in two parties which are adverse selection and agency 
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cost. As concluded by Murray and Vidhan (2007), the theory suggests that 
less profitable companies tend to have higher leverage against the trade-off 
theory. Moreover, the pecking order model argued that firms would favour 
internally generated funds to external finance when financing a prospective 
investment (Murray Z. F. et. al., 2007). 
 
2.3.1 Adverse selection 
 
The most common motivation for the pecking order is adverse selection 
developed by Myers and Majluf (Myers S. C. et. al., 1984). The adverse 
selection is referred to as asymmetric information which means that the 
sellers have more information than the buyers. Since adverse selection, 
when a seller has private information about the value of a good, buyers will 
discount the price they are willing to pay. According to Myers et. al.(1984), 
they made two assumptions based on adverse selection about managers. 
One is managers knowing more about the current earnings of firms and 
investment opportunities than outside investors. The information is 
considered as asymmetric information. The key performance is that the 
owner-manager of the firm NQRZVWKHWUXHYDOXHRIWKHILUP¶VDVVHWVDQG
growth opportunities. Outsider investor can only guess these values. The 
RWKHULVWKDWPDQDJHUDFWVLQH[LVWLQJVKDUHKROGHUV¶LQWHUHVW,QFRQFOXVLRQ
manager follows the pecking order theory (Jonathan B. B. et. al., 1999). In 
practice, Majuf and Myers (1984) explains if the manager offers to sell 
equity outside, the outside investors must ask why is willing to sell equity. In 
many cases the manager of an overvalue firm will be happy to sell equity in 
order to get a higher value from outside, vice versa (Myers S. et. al., 1984). 
 
Because managers find that it costs much more to issue equity that is 
underpriced, they tend to seek other forms of financing. According to 
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Jonathan et. al.(2011), compared with equity financing, although debt 
issues also may suffer from adverse selection, debt value has lower risk and 
LVQRWVHQVLWLYHWRPDQDJHU¶VSULYDWHLQIRUPDWLRQ,WPHDQVWKHGHJUHHRI
under pricing will tend to be smaller for debt than for equity. By avoiding 
under pricing, firm tend to finance their investment using its retained 
earnings when it is possible (Jonathan B. et. al., 2011). Thus, Jonathan et. 
al.(2011) conclude WKDW ³PDQDJHUV ZKR SHUFHLYH WKH ILUP¶V HTXLW\ LV
underpriced will have a preference to fund investment using retained 
earnings, or debt, raWKHUWKDQHTXLW\-RQDWKDQ%HWDO ´  
 
2.3.2 Agency cost 
 
In the traditional view, the argument was that managers had to explain the 
project detail to outside investor when using outside financing. It makes the 
manager expose themselves to investor monitoring. However, managers 
would not like to be monitored so that they prefer internal financing over 
external financing. Jensen and Meckling (1976) provide an agency theory to 
contribute this idea which is whether use debt or equity when external 
fiQDQFLQJ-HQVHQ0&$FFRUGLQJWR0\HUV¶VWXG\ (2003), he states 
that agency costs of equity will imply a financial hierarchy so that it could 
result in a pecking order (Myers S. C., 2003). 
 
)URPWKHSRLQWRI0\HUV¶DQG0DMOXI¶V(1984) view, suppose there are three 
sources for firms to finance their capital, which are retained earnings, debt 
and equity. Retained earnings are subject to have an adverse selection 
problem whereas debt has a less adverse selection problem (Myers S. C. et. 
al., 1984). In the light of outside investor, equity is more risky than debt. 
Moreover, both of the two have adverse selection problems but equity has 
more than debt. Hence, the outside investor would prefer a higher rate of 
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return on equity than debt. Considered the view of firms, firms would like to 
finance their project firstly with retained earnings. Then, consider financing 
with the debt source. The last source they would use is equity (Murray Z. F. 
et. al., 2003). Therefore, it has a pecking order. 
 
In the pecking order theory, there is no well defined debt-equity ratio 
because it has internal and external equity. The pecking order theory 
explains why the most profitable firms would like to borrow less because 
they do not need outside financing. In other words, less profitable firms 
would issue debt since they have not got enough internal earnings whereas 
more profitable firms can finance their project without external earnings. 
Moreover, the advantage of tax shield is considered as second order in the 
pecking order. Richard, Stewart and Franklin (2008) state that debt ratio 
changes when there is an imbalance of internal cash flow, net of dividends 
and investment opportunities (Richard A. B. et. al., 2008). Even in a highly 
profitable firm, they would like to keep their leverage low when they have 
limited investment opportunities. Firms with sufficient investment 
opportunities generated fund are driven to borrow debt as more as they can. 
Furthermore, the theory also explains the inverse intra industry relationship 
between profitability and leverage provided by Kester and Titman and 
Wessel (Kester C. W., 1986, Titman S. et. al., 1988). They argue that given 
dividend payout policy, the least profitable firms will have less internal funds 
and tend to stop borrowing more. The reason is if a firm invests generally in 
order to catch up with growth in their industry, the rate of investment would 
likely be the same within an industry. Hence, highly profitable firms tend to 
borrow less while firms with low profitability will borrow more. 
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3. Determinants 
 
In this section, it is going to present many empirical researches about the 
factors suggested by different theories of capital structure. Many empirical 
works have unearthed some stylized factors on capital structure choice, 
largely based on firms in the United States (Rajan R. et. al., 1995). It can 
use some factors such as non-debt tax shields, bankruptcy costs, industry 
effects, tangible asset, WKHILUP¶VVL]e and profitability suggested by Srein 
(Srein F.). Furthermore, it will state how to measure these factors in a 
quantitative way.  
 
3.1 Non-debt Tax shields 
 
As a model derived by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), the model considered 
that the optimal capital structure was impacted by corporate taxes, personal 
taxes and non-debt tax shields (DeAngelo H. et. al., 1980). The non-debt tax 
shield is defined as a tax advantage related to corporate tax. They argued 
that firms with tax deductions for depreciation, carry forwarded tax loss and 
investment tax credits have tax benefits of debt financing. In other words, if 
firms can get large non debt tax shield from tax deductions, carry forwarded 
tax loss and investment tax credits, they would prefer for financing with less 
debt in their capital structure. Both trade-off theory and pecking order 
theory are supported with DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). As the model 
concluded, it has a negative relationship between leverage and the non-debt 
tax shield (DeAngelo H. et. al., 1980). In trade-off theory and pecking order 
theory, Ross (1977) explains his view to support the negative relationship 
(Ross S., 1977). Firms with non debt shields may suffer tax problem when 
they have over leverage if they are not able to fulfil all their possible tax 
shield. Then, debt will become a burden for firms. Therefore, higher amount 
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of non-debt tax shield firms have, lower amount of debt will be used for 
financing capital structure. 
 
On the other hand, in the pecking order theory, others argued in a different 
relationship against the trade-off theory, such as Scott, Moore and so on. 
Scott and Moore (1977) argue that debt is less risky than equity (Scott J., 
1977, Moore T. W., 1986). It is one of the reasons why debt prefers than 
equity. Compared with non-debt tax shield, the advantage of debt may 
deadweight the non-debt tax shield. Hence, Scott (1977) and Moore (1986) 
also hypothesize a positive relationship between leverage and non-debt tax 
shields. In conclusion, it is not convinced of the relationship between 
leverage and non-debt tax shields supported by Bradley et. al., Titman 
(Bradley M. et. al., 1982; Titman, S., 1984). 
 
$V7LWPDQDQG:HVVHOV¶(1988) view, indicator of non-debt tax shield can 
express as the ratios of investment tax credits over total assets or 
depreciation over total assets (Titman S. et. al. 1988). And Bradley et. al. 
(1982) express the indicator as the ratio of depreciation expense to total 
assets (Bradley M. et. al., 1982). The study here will choose the ratio of 
depreciation expense to total assets as an indicator of non-debt tax shield. 
 
3.2 Size 
 
Some evidences were provided that it has a relationship between size and 
leverage. As evidences from Warner (1977) and Ang, Chua, and McConnell 
(1985), they suggest that when firms are suffering from bankruptcy, large 
size firms seem to have more capacities to suffer from direct bankruptcy 
costs than small size firms (Warner J., 1977, Ang C. K. et. al., 1985). 
Furthermore, large size firms tend to well diversified so that they have less 
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risk of bankruptcy. In other words, large size firms have more motivations to 
borrow debt. In conclusion, it suggests that there exists a positive 
relationship between size and leverage supported the trade-off theory. 
 
On the contrary, Smith (1977) argues that the cost of issuing debt is related 
to WKHILUP¶VVL]H (Smith C., 1977). Small size firms cost much to issue equity 
so that they tend to finance their capital structure with debt. In other words, 
the large size firm will tend to use retained earning while small size firms 
tend to borrow debt. It suggests that it has a negative relationship between 
size and leverage in pecking order theory. Moreover, Rajan and Zingale 
(1995) prove their point to support the relationship. Large firms have lower 
cost of asymmetries information between inside owners and outside 
investors. Thus, large size firms should have lower leverage because they 
are easy to issue equity with lower cost of asymmetries information (Rajan 
R. G., 1995). Therefore, in pecking order theory, it suggests that it has a 
negative relationship between size and leverage. The indicator of size can 
express as the logarithm of sales or quit rates (Titman S. et. al., 1988). In 
this study, it will express the size as the logarithm of sales. 
 
3.3 Growth opportunity 
 
Growth opportunity is identified in many empirical works and different 
relationships between leverage and growth opportunity are presented. The 
first point argued is that growth opportunity affected the relation between 
managers and shareholders which cause agency cost. In trade-off theory, 
Lang, Ofek, and StulZ (1996) argue that it has a negative relationship 
between leverage and growth opportunity (Lang L. E. et. al., 1996). They 
find that firms with good growth opportunity and few agency problems will 
have a significant negative relationship between debt and growth 
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opportunity. That is supported by Jensen and Meckling (1975), Smith and 
Warner (1979), and Green (1984) (Jensen M. et. al., 1975, Smith C. 1977, 
Warner, J., 1979, Green R., 1984). They summarize that the agency cost will 
reduce when issuing convertible debt. Myers  (1977) notes that it is a more 
significant positive relationship between short-term debt and growth 
opportunity (Myers S., 1977). He argues it has less agency problems 
between managers and shareholders when issuing short-term debt. 
 
On the other hand, the second point argued is that growth opportunity 
cannot create generate current taxable income so that shareholders are 
worried about this investment. However, investment can add to the value of 
firms and managers would like to do it. For this argument, Titman and 
Wessels (1988) state that it has a positive relationship between debt and 
growth opportunity (Titman S. et. al., 1988). Moreover, if a firm cannot raise 
enough finance with retained earnings for a good investment, they prefer 
debt than equity according to pecking order. Frank and Goyal (2009) put 
forth a firm with good investment opportunity would have motivation to 
finance with debt (Frank Z. et. al., 2009). In other words, they present a 
positive relationship between debt and growth opportunity.  
 
Indicators of growth are expressly as capital expenditures over total assets 
(Titman S. et. al., 1988), or market-to-book ratio (Barclay M. L. et.al, 1996). 
Also, some used RD/S which means research and development over sales. 
,Q WKLV VWXG\ LW LV JRLQJ WR IROORZ 7LWPDQ¶V HTXDWLRQ ZKLFK LV FDSLWDO
expenditures over total assets.  
 
3.4 Tangible assets 
 
In most empirical research, they thought about that the type of assets would 
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affect the capital structure. Firstly, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that it 
is positive relationship between tangible asset and leverage in the light of 
agency cost (Jensen M. et. al., 1976). It is supported by Scott (1972), Myers 
DQG0DMXI¶V(1984) research. They suggest that the firm would have the 
advantage of tangible assets. More generally, supposed a firm shifts to 
riskier investment after insurance of debt or transfer wealth from creditors 
to shareholders, hence, the firm will have an agency cost of debt. And firms 
ZKLFKKDYHKLJKWDQJLEOHDVVHWVFDQRYHUFRPHWKHOHQGHU¶VULVNRIVXIIHULQJ
such agency cost (Scott J., 1972, Myers S. et. al., 1984). In other words, 
firms have high tangible assets can overcome such agency cost of debt even 
though they are issuing more debt. Firms rich in tangible asset will tend to 
have more debt. Hence, high tangible assets are expected to have a high 
leverage. However, others argued in opposite relationship between tangible 
DVVHWVDQGOHYHUDJH$V*URVVPDQDQG+DUW¶V(1982) view, in the light of 
bankruptcy cost, they point out the tendency of consuming debt will be 
diminished because of the fear of bankruptcy (Grossman et. al., 1982). 
Managers are exposing themselves to bondholders in highly leveraged firms. 
It means that bondholders monitor managers closely and that will generate 
an agency cost. The agency cost may be higher so that the tangible asset 
cannot remove the all of the agency cost. Therefore, it exists a bankruptcy 
cost in a firm with highly leveraged. In conclusion, the trade-off theory has 
a mixed relationship between tangible assets and leverage. 
 
Moreover, in pecking order theory, Myers and Majluf (1984) also argue that 
managers will have more information than outside investors. The cost of 
issuing debt with known value will avoid the asymmetric information costs 
(Myers S. et. al., 1984). For this reason, the firms will issue more debt to 
take advantage of this opportunity. In other words, pecking order theory 
suggested that it has the same relationship as the one suggested by the 
trade-off theory. The indicators of tangible asset have two main equations. 
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One is the ratio of intangible assets to total asset put forth by Titman and 
Wessels (Titman S. et. al., 1988). The other is the ratio of property, plant 
and equipment to total assets presented by Friend and Lang (Friend I. et. al., 
1988). In this study, it will use the ratio followed by Friend and Lang, which 
is property, plant and equipment to total assets. 
 
3.5 Liquidity 
 
,Q2]NDQ¶s (2001) empirical research, he argued that liquidity has a mixed 
impact on the capital structure decision (Ozkan A, 2001). Liquidity ratio 
means how the ability of companies can repay the loan to creditors. In other 
words, it can be considered as potential risk of firms. Firms with high 
liquidity ratio have motivation to borrow more debt because they have the 
capacity to repay the loan. In the view of trade-off theory, Ozkan (2001) 
suggests that firms with high liquidity can support a relative leverage as 
they are possible to meet the loan repayment. The firms with high liquidity 
may have less bankruptcy risk. It means that they are not suffering much 
bankruptcy costs. Moreover, Pano (2003) argues in the light of the free cash 
flow problem. Considered the free cash flow of a firm, the firms have high 
liquidity means that they also have higher free cash flow. In order to limited 
managers who may have tended to use available cash, the shareholders 
would like to use more debt (Pano A., 2003). This suggests a positive 
relationship between liquidity and leverage. 
 
On the other side, firms with high liquidity can fund their investments with 
their own finance without raising external finance. In the pecking order 
theory, that the firm prefers internal finance to external finance suggests it 
is following the pecking order. Therefore, Ozkan (2001) states that the 
liquidity position of firms should imply a negative relationship with its 
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leverage (Ozkan A., 2001). In addition, Prowse (1991) argues in the view of 
agency cost to support the negative relationship. Prowse claimed the 
OLTXLGLW\RIFRPSDQ\¶VDVVHWVFDQEHH[SODLQHGWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKWKHVH
assets can be manipulated by shareholders at the expense of bondholders 
(Prowse S. D., 1991). In conclusion, it has a negative relationship between 
liquidity and leverage in the light of pecking order. The indicator of liquidity 
ZLOOPDLQO\EHH[SUHVVIROORZLQJ=RNDQ¶VVWXG\ZKLFKLVWKHUDWLRRIFXUUHQW
assets to current liability (Ozkan A, 2001). 
 
3.6 Profitability 
 
Many empirical researches provided evidences that profitability is a very 
important factor in capital structure. It has a conflict relationship between 
profitability and leverage in the two theories. Ross (1977) suggests that the 
trade-off theory predicted that the high profitability firm should have more 
debt in order to offset the corporate tax (Ross S., 1977). One of the points 
argued in trade-off theory is a tax shield explained by Modigliani and Myers 
(1958). They think that the most motivation to use debt is a tax shield 
(Modigliani F. et. al., 1958). And in order to get the tax shield, firms need to 
be profitable. Firms would tend to issue more debt to invest the projects so 
that they can enlarge their production. In other words, firms with higher 
profitability would tend to issue more debt and less profitability firms would 
issue less debt. The other point argued in trade-off theory is free cash flow 
by Jensen. Jensen claimed that in order to fund their investment, they have 
to finance their capital structure outside. However, lower amount of the cash 
flow they have, the riskier they issue a large amount of debt (Jensen M., 
1976). Hence, it is to predict a positive relationship between profitability and 
leverage. 
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On the opposite side, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue it has a negative 
relationship between profitability and leverage since the pecking order 
hypothesis (Myers S. et. al., 1984). Stein points out that the pecking order 
theory suggests that firms prefer retained earnings because they are less 
costly type of financing than debt or equity (Stein F.). Hence, if firms are 
highly profitable, they would have enough retained earnings to invest so 
that they will not issue debt. In other words, it suggests a negative 
relationship. Moreover, Myers and Majluf (1984) also discuss debt issuing or 
equity could have costs because of asymmetric information problem (Myers 
S. et. al., 1984). In order to avoid these costs, firms with highly profitability 
could raise their funds with own retained earnings. Hence, the amount of 
retained earnings can be an important factor in capital structure. And as 
Titman and Wessel and Fama and French show that the profits and leverage 
have a negative correlation (Titman S. et. al., 1988, Fama E. et. al., 2002). 
The indicators of profitability can be expressed as a ratio of operating 
income over sales (Titman et. al., 1988) or ratio of tax over total assets 
(Booth et. al., 2001). In this study, it will use operating income over total 
asset, which put forth by Ranjan and Zingales, and Ozken (Ranjan R. G., 
1995, Ozken A., 2001).  
 
3.7 Industry classification 
 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) observe the industry characteristics are one of 
the determinants of capital structure which they had extended this 
determination with cross-country comparisons (Rajan R. G. et. al., 1995). 
Since the type of assets, the risk of asset and the requirement of external 
fund for a firm is vary from different industries, Myers and Haris and Raviv 
(1991) suggest that it had a different leverage level from industry to 
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industry (Myers S., 1984, Haris M. et. al., 1991). William et. al. (2007) 
summarize the studies as followed. Industries such as banking, electric 
power generation, transportation, and telecommunications have higher debt 
ratios than others (William L. M. et. al., 2007). The reason for higher debt 
ratios is relative to the ability of profitability. Firms with higher profitability 
tend to issue more debt as suggesting by trade-off theory. In addition, 
investors trust good industry characteristics because the government will 
not allow these firms to bankrupt (William L. M. et. al., 2007). Hence, it 
suggested a positive relationship in such industry.  
 
However, Titman (1984) suggests that firms that make products will require 
availability cash as more because he found liquidation especially costly 
(Titman S., 1984). It means that firms manufacturing machines and 
equipment should be less debt in the light of pecking order. The firms prefer 
internal finance than external finance to avoid the cost of debt. In other 
word, it has a negative relationship. 
 
In conclusion, it can show all the differences between trade-off theory and 
the pecking order theory in determinants as follows according to previous 
empirical researches. 
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Variables Definitions Trade-of
f theory 
The 
peckin
g order 
theory 
Evidence
s 
Non-debt tax shields 
(NDTS) 
Depreciation 
expense/total 
assets 
- N/A -: 
DeAngelo 
H. et. al., 
1980 
Ross S., 
1977 etc 
N/A: 
Bradley 
M. et. al., 
1982; 
Titman, 
S., 1984 
etc 
Size(SIZE) logarithm of sales + - +: 
Warner 
J., 1977, 
Ang C. K. 
et. al., 
1985 etc 
-: Smith 
C., 1977 
Rajan R. 
G., 1995 
etc 
Growth 
opportunity(GRO) 
capital 
expenditures/tota
l assets 
- + -: Lang L. 
E. et. al., 
1996 
Jensen M. 
et. al., 
1975, 
Smith C. 
1977, 
Warner, 
J., 1979, 
Green R., 
1984 
Myers S., 
1977 etc 
+: 
Titman S. 
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et. al., 
1988 
Frank Z. 
et. al., 
2009 
Tangible assets(TA) Property, plant 
and 
equipment/total 
assets. 
+/- + +/-: + 
Frank Z. 
et. al., 
2009 
Scott J., 
1972, 
Myers S. 
et. al., 
1984 etc 
- 
Grossma
n et. al., 
1982 etc 
+: Myers 
S. et. al., 
1984 etc 
Liquidity(LIQUIDITY) current assets/ 
current liability 
+ - +: Ozkan 
A, 2001 
Pano A., 
2003 etc 
-: Ozkan 
A., 2001 
Prowse S. 
D., 1991 
etc 
Profitability(PRO) operating 
income/total 
asset 
+ - +: Ross 
S., 1977 
Modiglian
i F. et. al., 
1958 
Jensen 
M., 1976 
etc 
-: Myers 
S. et. al., 
1984 
Titman S. 
et. al., 
1988, 
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Fama E. 
et. al., 
2002 etc 
Industry 
classification(INDSTRY
) 
   Rajan R. 
G. et. al., 
1995 
Myers S., 
1984, 
Haris M. 
et. al., 
1991 
William L. 
M. et. al., 
2007 
Titman 
S., 1984 
etc  
 
4. Data collection and Methodology 
 
It is going to move into empirical part after reviewing the hypothetical 
framework and findings from theories of capital structure. In this section, it 
is going to detail the sample data this paper collected and the empirical 
method used in this paper. 
 
4.1 Data collection 
 
Since this paper is researching for the companies in Japan, the data 
collected would be accounting data from Japanese companies. In order to 
get more trustable data from balance sheets, income statements and cash 
flow statements, it would like to choose companies basic on NIKKIE 225, 
which is an index of 225 representative companies in Japan. The data are 
collected from datasteam and the period is from 2003 to 2013. In other 
words, the data collected yearly accounting data for the dissertation is a 
panel data from Japanese NIKKIE 225 index over the period from 2003 to 
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2013.  
 
However, it is not all the data reliable for our study. Hence, it has to modify 
the data according to econometric procedure. Firstly, it has to remove the 
financial industries such as banks, financial services, nonlife insurance, life 
insurance and real estate investment and services from the sample data 
because the regulation of these financial industries is quite different from 
other industries. As Shah and Khan (2007) explain, the characteristics of 
financial industries such as deposit insurance and different financial report 
rules are special and different from other industries (Shah A. et. al., 2007). 
William and Scott and Lawrence (2007) explain the investors believed that 
the regulation of such industries involves at least guarantee that the 
government will not allow them to go into bankruptcy (William L. M. et. al., 
2007). That is quite different regulation between financial industries and 
non-financial industries. Hence, it has to eliminate the financial industries 
from the sample data. Secondly, it is not receivable to analyse the figures 
which are less than three years. The special data will affect the result 
VLJQLILFDQWO\$V2]NDQ¶V  (2001) statement, it has to be continuous time 
series for more than three years of the variables required in the study 
(Ozkan A., 2001). Therefore, the companies included only three years 
accounting data will not appear in the sample data. Last but not least, the 
accounting rules should be consistent, so the companies have to register in 
Japan and follow the accounting rules in Japan. The reason is that it needs to 
have a consistent circumstance for the data so that it can reduce the 
unsteadiness.  
 
Hence, after the econometric procedure, the number of observations for the 
sample is 193 companies which are from 9 industries excluding financial 
industry during the period from 2003 to 2013. And the total observation in 
the sample data is 1892. It can have a clear overview of the sample data 
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through tables. The table 1 is as follows: 
 
Industry Frequency Percentage 
Consumer Goods 416 21.99 
Oil & Gas 16 0.85 
Industrials 659 34.83 
Consumer Services 201 10.62 
Basic Materials 277 14.64 
Technology 139 7.35 
Health Care 94 4.97 
Telecommunications 40 2.11 
Utilities 50 2.64 
Total 1892 100 
TABLE 1: The summary of industry characteristics  
 
The table 1 above shows clearly what the industries are included and how 
many percentages and numbers in the sample data. Through the overall of 
sample data, it has a reliable cross-section data in different industries. 
 
4.1.1 Independent variable definition 
 
As defined in the previous part, the independent variables were defined 
respectively. NDTS is the ratio of depreciation expense to total assets, size is 
simply logarithm of sales, and GRO is the ratio of capital expenditures to 
total assets, TA is property, plant and equipment to total assets, LIQUIDITY 
is the ratio of current assets to current liability and PRO is the ratio of 
operating income to total assets.  
 
As table 2 summarized, it is easy to see that the most floating independent 
variable is liquidity, which the mean is 61.56938 and the standard deviation 
is 345.7952. The highest range of liquidity suggests that the companies in 
Japan may face a potential bankruptcy risk due to the quite different range 
of liquidity ratio. According to the equation of liquidity, the mean 61.56938 
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states that the average current assets are significant higher than the 
average current liability. In other words, the average of ability that repay for 
the loan is good. However, the standard deviation 345.7952 suggests that it 
has a great gap among different companies. Some companies can have a 
good ability to repay to loan and expand their profitability while some 
companies are facing the potential risk of bankruptcy because they have 
fewer current assets than the current liability they bear and cannot increase 
their value from the market. Moreover, the size is relative higher ratio 
excluding the liquidity. The size is the simply logarithm of sales. It means 
that it can represent to the sales in the market. Furthermore, the size has a 
similar suggestion as liquidity. The mean 9.541216 suggests that the 
average of profitability is good. Companies can create their value from the 
market. On the other hand, the standard deviation 7.162113 means that 
companies have different performance in the market. While some 
companies have large markets, other companies have difficulty to create 
value from markets. The growth opportunities have a relatively higher mean 
4.865682 and standard deviation 3.180465. It suggests that the companies 
have different performance in financing their capital structure. The 
companies have wide range requirement of financing from outside market 
because of a high variance and they tend to invest in the project because of 
a high mean.  
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Independent 
variables 
Observation Mean Standard 
deviation 
NDTS (Non-debt 
tax shields) 
1892 0.0436582 0.223078 
SIZE (Size) 1892 9.541216 7.162113 
GRO (Growth 
opportunities) 
1892 4.865682 3.180465 
TA (Tangible 
assets) 
1892 0.344286 0.1795787 
LIQUIDITY 
(Liquidity) 
1365 61.56938 345.7952 
PRO (Profitability) 1892 0.0610392 0.0609237 
TABLE 2: The summary of Independent variables 
 
4.1.2 Dependent Variable definition 
 
Since many empirical researches discussed above were selecting long term 
debt ratio and short term debt ratio as their dependent variable, it is 
reasonable to apply long term debt ratio and short term debt ratio followed 
by the previous researches. In this study, the long term debt ratio is defined 
as a ratio of long term debt to total assets. Similarly, the short term debt 
ratio is expressed as a ratio of short term debt to total assets. However, it 
still has an argument in measuring the value of the dependent variable. The 
argument between market value and book value is put forward by Barclay, 
Myers and so on. Barclay suggested that it is no reason to use either book 
value or market value as book value is a backward looking while market 
value is forward looking (Barclay et. al., 2006). However, Myers (1977) 
argues that book value can represent the fluctuating of financial markets 
and managers believed that market value is not reliable because the market 
value is following the corporate financial policy (Myers S. C., 1977). In 
addition, as Guihai and Frank (2006) point out that it is difficult to measure 
the market value. Moreover, the market value is difficult to define clearly 
since the market change over time (Guihai H. et. al, 2006). Therefore, in this 
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study, it is following to apply book value for the dependent variables. The 
two dependent variables can be summarized as a table 3 as follow: 
 
Dependent 
variable 
Observation Mean Standard 
deviation 
LTD 1892 0.1750851 0.1280496 
STD 1892 0.1133681 0.0861607 
TABLE 3: The summary of dependent variables 
 
The mean and variance of long term debt ratio is 0.1750851 and 0.1280496 
respectively whereas the mean and variance of short term debt ratio are 
0.1133681 and 0.0861607. Compared the figures for long term debt ratio 
and short term debt ratio, it suggests that companies are a little prefer long 
term debt than short term debt since the difference of mean. However, in the 
light of variance, companies have different performance in financing long 
term debt as the variance is 0.1280496 while companies perform the same 
behaviour in financing short term debt since the small variance which is 
0.0861607. The graph 4 below can show companies have similar 
performance in increasing short term debt over time. From 2003 to 2013, 
the companies tend to have similar short term debt, especially in the year 
2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011 and 2012.  
 
GRAPH 4: The differences between long term debt and short term debt from 
2003 to 2012 
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4.2 Methodology 
 
Since the study is based on quantitative analysis, it is recommended to use 
a quantitative approach rather than qualitative approach. The empirical 
research approaches including ANOVA, cross-sectional analysis and panel 
data analysis are considered in this study. ANOVA is a research approach to 
study the relationship between independent variables and dummy variables 
or qualitative variables (Gujarati et. al., 2009). With ANOVA approach, it is 
going to do regression between the dependent variables which are long term 
debt ratio and short term debt ratio with the dummy variable. The purposes 
for using ANOVA is to analysis the industry classification by creating dummy 
variables and then do a regression between long term debt ratio and short 
term debt ratio with the dummy variables. In the cross-sectional analysis, it 
is a first try to regress the data through ordinary least squares (OLS). 
However, compared with panel data analysis, it can have an argument with 
which model is more appropriate for this study. Therefore, it is necessary to 
have a second try to regress the panel data through ordinary least squares. 
 
4.2.1 ANOVA test for industry classification 
 
In the sample data, it is specified the companies in 9 industries which are 
Consumer Goods, Oil & Gas, Industrials, Consumer Services, Basic Materials, 
Technology, Health Care, Telecommunications and Utilities. The 9 different 
industries have different characteristics so that there are different effects on 
the capital structure decision for each firm. It is confirmed by Long and 
Malitz that industry classification has a significant effect in the capital 
structure (Long M. et. al., 1985). To find out the influence from industry 
classification, it is going to make use of the one way ANOVA model. The 9 
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industries are necessary to be created as industry dummy variables and 
regress against independent variable. In other words, the one way ANOVA is 
adopted to research the effect from industries to leverage. The empirical 
works define the ANOVA model as follows, 
 
YLTD=A + Bi* DUMMY VARIABLES + ei 
YSTD=A + Bi*DUMMY VARIABLES + ei 
 
Where YLTD and YSTD are accounted as long-term leverage and short-term 
leverage, respectively; A is constant intercept in the regression; Bi 
represents the coefficient between leverages and dummy variables; DUMMY 
VARIABLES are classified as industrial dummy variables; ei is standard error 
terms. 
 
4.2.2 Cross-sectional analysis 
 
As Hill, Griffiths and Lim (2001) explain, cross-section data is defined as a 
set of data on a number of economic units such as firms and industries at 
only a given time point (Hill R. C. et. al., 2012). As the definition, it is clear 
that if following cross-sectional analysis, the sample data will only have one 
year time point. That will cause an unauthentic result in this study due to 
only consider the cross-sectional data. The model defined in cross-sectional 
analysis is as follows, 
 
YLTD=A + B1NDTS + B2SIZE + B3GRO + B4TA + B5 LIQUIDITY + B6PRO +ei 
YSTD=A + B1NDTS + B2SIZE + B3GRO + B4TA + B5 LIQUIDITY + B6PRO +ei 
 
Where YLTD and YSTD are same meaning as an ANOVA model; NDTS is proxy 
for non-debt tax shields; SIZE is proxy for sales; GRO is proxy for growth 
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opportunities; TA is a proxy for tangible assets; LIQUIDITY is a proxy for 
liquidity; PRO is a proxy for profitability; B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6 are coefficients 
between NDTS, SIZE, GRO, TA, LIQUIDITY, PRO with independent variables, 
respectively; ei is error terms. 
 
4.2.3 Panel data analysis 
 
Panel data are also called longitudinal data, which has observations on 
different firms following by time periods according to Hill, Griffiths and Lim 
(Hill R. C. et. al., 2012). Compared with the simple model which is a 
cross-sectional analysis with panel data analysis, it has some reasons to 
select panel data analysis as our approach in order to get reliable results. 
 
Firstly, it is the most important and essential reason for selecting panel data 
analysis. According to Hill, Griffiths and Lim (2012), the complex and rich 
structure of panel data can address a wide range of issue and enhance the 
degree of freedom ((Hill R. C. et. al., 2012). In other words, panel data are 
more appropriate in this study because the complex theories discussed in 
the previous part6HFRQGO\DFFRUGLQJWR+VLDR¶VSRLQWSXUHWLPH-series 
data have to do a lot of work to reduce the co-linearity within the variables. 
By combining cross-sectional data with time-series data which is panel data, 
it helps to ease problems of multicollinearity and enhance the confidence 
level of the results (Hsiao C., 2003). Hence, it eliminates a requirement to do 
a long run of data and increase the number of degrees of freedom. Thirdly, 
Hill, Griffiths and Lin (2012) point out that it can keep the omitted variables 
bias avoided by structuring panel data in a suitable way (Hill R. C. et. al., 
2012). Therefore, the results can be more trustable and meaningful. 
 
In the previous empirical works, Ozkan, Bevan and Danbolt define the panel 
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data model (Ozkan A., 2001, Bevan A. et. al., 2002). The model is expressed 
as follows: 
YLTD=A + B1NDTS + B2SIZE + B3GRO + B4TA + B5 LIQUIDITY + B6PRO + fit 
+ ei 
YSTD=A + B1NDTS + B2SIZE + B3GRO + B4TA + B5 LIQUIDITY + B6PRO + fit 
+ ei 
 
Where YLTD, YSTD, B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, ei NDTS, SIZE, GRO, TA, LIQUIDITY, 
PRO, ei is the same meaning as a cross-sectional model. Moreover, it has a 
fit in the panel data model which means firm-specific effects.  
 
The hypotheses assumption of this model is, 
The null hypotheses: H0 : B0 = B1 = B2 = B3= B4 = B5= B6 = 0. The null 
hypotheses mean that all the variables cannot explain the relationship 
between leverages and variables in Japanese firms.  
The alternative hypotheses: H0 : B0 is false. It means that at least one of the 
variables can explain the relationship between leverages and variables in 
Japanese firms.  
 
In financial econometric, there are three major panel data models which are 
pooled OLS model, fixed OLS model and random OLS model. It will discuss 
which model is appropriate for the sample data in this study based on 
diagnostic tests.  
 
5. Empirical research and analysis 
 
In this part, it is going to summarize the empirical research for the sample 
data and present the results of the research. Moreover, it is to present what 
factors affect the capital structure of Japanese firms and analyse the reason 
why the factors affect the capital structure according to the pervious 
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theories. 
 
5.1 Empirical results from ANOVA and analysis of 
the industry classification 
 
$V 5DMDQ DQG =LQJDOHV¶V (1995) finding, the industry characteristics can 
affect the capital structure when different industries consider their decisions 
within their own regulation (Rajan R. G. et. al., 1995). One-way ANOVA 
analysis is applied in this study in order to find whether the industry 
characteristics will affect the capital structure and which industries have the 
most significant influence. The industries are considered as dummy 
variables in the one-way ANOVA model. As pervious part, the summary of 
industries was presented in table 4. And the ANOVA results are going to 
present as follows: 
 
Type of leverage F value Prob > F (p value) 
Long term debt leverage 70.28 0.0000 
Short term debt leverage 23.41 0.0000 
TABLE 4: Results of ANOVA 
 
The above table 4 for one-way ANOVA model shows that it can reject the null 
hypothesis in 1% confidence level which is both of the two leverages of all 
industry classification is the same according to both p values are less than 
1%. In other words, the industry classification will affect the decision of 
capital structure. The overall results of the ANOVA model in this study are 
confirmed within the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory. In order 
to explain the industry classification clearly, it needs to look at the 
coefficients from the regression between both two leverages with dummy 
variables. The coefficients are shown in the following table 5. 
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 LTD STD 
Consumer Goods -0.0880672 (0.000) 0.400762 (0.003) 
Oil & Gas -0.1463392 (0.000) -0.0013447 (0.956) 
Industrials -0.0698233 (0.000) 0.0427792 (0.001) 
Consumer Services 0.0525872 (0.000) 0.0149135 (0.001) 
Basic Materials -0.057659 (0.007) 0.0744802 (0.296) 
Technology -0.1215716 (0.002) 0.0066764 (0.000) 
Health Care -0.1593753 (0.000) -0.0369155 (0.651) 
Telecommunications 0 (omitted)) 0 (omitted) 
Utilities 0.1623521 (0.000) 0.0072591 (0.678) 
Constant 0.235789 (0.000) 0.0783305 (0.000) 
R2 0.2299 0.0904 
Number of observations 1892 1892 
TABLE 5: The coefficients from ANOVA 
 
Firstly, the R2 for long term leverage and short term leverage are 22.99% 
(0.2299) and 9.04% (0.0904), respectively. Since it is no research for 
-DSDQHVHILUPVLWLVJRLQJWRWDNH%HQQHWWDQG'RQQHOO\¶V(1993) research 
for a benchmark. According to their finding, industry classification could be 
explained around 9.4% of the variation in terms of book value basing on the 
UK sample data (Bennett M. et. al., 1993). Hence, it is confident in 
explaining the industry classification using long term debt leverage which 
has 22.99% R2. Moreover, it is easy and clear to conclude that in regression 
between long term leverage with dummy variables, all the coefficients are 
strongly significant in 1% confidence level due to all the p values are less 
than 1%. On the other hand, in the light of the regression between short 
term leverage with dummy variables, there are only five dummy variables 
significant and others are not. It means that it is that not all the coefficients 
can explain the industry classification. Therefore, this study is going to 
select the regression between long term leverage and dummy variables to 
discuss the industry classification. 
 
Furthermore, the summary of mean can explain the relationship between 
long term leverage and short term leverage across different industries. The 
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mean is summarized as follows, and it can express by graph to see clearly. 
It helps to explain how the industry classification affects the decision of 
capital structure. 
 
 Mean of LTD Mean of STD 
Consumer Goods 0.14766172 0.11840667 
Oil & Gas 0.08938979 0.0769855 
Industrials 0.16590568 0.12110968 
Consumer Services 0.28831616 0.09324392 
Basic Materials 0.17596301 0.15281066 
Technology 0.11415731 0.0850069 
Health Care 0.07635366 0.04141493 
Telecommunications 0.2357894 0.07833046 
Utilities 0.39808103 0.08558959 
TABLE 6: The summary of mean of long term debt and short term debt 
 
 
GRAPH 5: The trend of firms to finance the capital structure with long term debt 
and short term debt 
 
From the above table 6 and graph 5, it is easy to confirm that the firms in 
Japan prefer long term leverage than short term leverage as the graph 
shows that the mean of LTD is always higher than the mean of STD. The 
reason why the firms prefer long term leverage might be the cost of long 
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term debt. The long term debt is cheaper than the short term debt due to the 
different interest rate. Moreover, some industries have a quite significant 
performance in the decision of capital structure. Compared the mean of LTD 
with the mean of STD, customer services and utilities industries can 
represent for this performance. The reason for these two industries might 
IROORZ:LOOLDP¶VRSWLRQ:LOOLDP/0HWDO, 2007). For customer services, 
the industry tends to have a higher ability of profitability so that they can 
bear a long term loan. Since this industry can raise their finance, they can 
enlarge their market to get more profit. For utilities, investors trust the 
industry regulation since the government will not allow these firms to 
bankrupt easily. As this reason, this industry can afford a large long term 
debt. Moreover, the coefficients of both tow industries also confirm this 
performance. The coefficient of customer services is 0.0525872 as well as 
the coefficient of utilities is 0.1623521. Only these tow coefficients are 
positive among all the coefficients. It has a good reason to believe that both 
of these industries prefer long term debt than short term debt. 
 
In our results of the coefficients, it is clear to see that most of the coefficients 
are negative with the long term leverage except for the customer services 
and utilities. The reason why most of the industries have a negative 
relationship between long term leverage and industry classification might be 
the cash flow problem. As Titman (1984) points out, some firms require free 
cash as more as they can because the costly liquidation (Titman S., 1984). 
For industry and basic material which the coefficients are -0.0698233 and 
-0.057659 respectively, they are matching the view with the cash flow 
problem. Due to the characteristic of these industries, it takes a longer 
period for manufacturing machines or equipments. Moreover, it also needs 
longer times to convert products into cash flow. Therefore, the liquidation is 
especially costly for these industries. These firms prefer internal finance 
than external finance to avoid the cost of debt. Moreover, they keep low risk 
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of default the debt so that they have less bankruptcy risk. 
 
Take health care for another example; the health care industry has different 
regulations with industry and basic material because the health care 
industry is considered as firms mainly had intangible assets. Moreover, 
Rajan and Zngales (1995) point out that this industry has a negative 
relationship with leverage (Rajan R. G. et. al., 1995). The reason for the 
negative coefficient in the health care industry might follow the pecking 
order theory. The managers can access the insider information, for example 
a new innovative product, easier than outside investors. This will cause 
asymmetric information problems in the market. In order to avoid the cost 
of debt, firms would tend to finance their capital structure using internally 
found. Hence, the health care industry could have a negative relationship. 
The same reason can apply to the technology industry. Since technology 
industry is a high tech industry so that they reform their products very 
quickly. For this kind of industry, high long term leverage may cause their 
insufficient retained earnings. Therefore, they are going to face a free cash 
flow problem. For this reason, the technology industry would tend to have a 
negative relationship. 
 
5.2 Empirical results from panel data model and 
analysis of the determinants 
 
Since there are three major panel data models in financial econometric, it 
needs some diagnostic tests to decide which one is more appropriate for the 
sample data in this study. In the following part, it is going to present the 
result of the diagnostic tests. 
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5.2.1 Diagnostic tests 
 
5.2.1.1 Multi-collinearity problem 
 
One of important assumptions that are made by OLS regression is that the 
explanatory variables are not multi-correlated with each other. As Chris 
explained, it means that the explanatory variables are independent of each 
other and to be said to be orthogonal to one another (Chris B., 2008). If the 
multi-colinearity problem exists in the explanatory variables, the regression 
ZRXOGKDYH VRPHSUREOHPV$FFRUGLQJ WR&KULV¶V VWXG\5-square will be 
affected by the multi-colinearity problem so that it cannot be a significant 
measurement for the regression. More details, since the R - square will be 
high and the individual coefficient will have high standard errors, individual 
coefficient are not significant. Secondly, the small changes in explanatory 
variables will cause a very significant change in the whole regression. Finally, 
the confidence intervals will be large range due to this problem. Hence, it will 
give an inappropriate conclusion from this regression (Chris B., 2008). 
Correlation matrix among the explanatory variables will be made use in this 
study as it is a simple and clear approach to test the multi-colinearity 
problem. As Gujarati and Porter (2009) point out, the benchmark for the 
correlation matrix is less than 0.8 in coefficient between two independent 
variables (Gujarati et. al., 2009). If the coefficient between two variables is 
below 0.8, then it will conclude that it is not multi-colinearity problem in the 
explanatory variables. The correlation matrix table for our sample data is 
shown below table 7, 
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 LTD STD NDTS SIZE GRO TA LIQUIDI
TY 
PRO 
LTD 1.000
0 
       
STD 0.309
3 
1.000
0 
      
NDTS 0.104
3 
0.016
0 
1.000
0 
     
SIZE -0.01
07 
-0.32
71 
0.263
2 
1.000
0 
    
GRO 0.112
5 
-0.01
08 
0.503
3 
00.26
39 
1.000
0 
   
TA 0.542
1 
0.181
0 
0.339
1 
0.223
0 
0.416
8 
1.000
0 
  
LIQUIDI
TY 
-0.09
64 
-0.06
96 
0.010
1 
0.029
2 
0.006
2 
-0.09
03 
1.0000  
PRO -0.32
80 
-0.32
48 
0.010
8 
0.541
4 
0.143
3 
-0.12
73 
0.2282 1.000
0 
TABLE 7: The result from multi-colinearity test 
 
According to the table, the biggest coefficient is 0.5421 between LTD and TA. 
It is still less than the benchmark 0.8. Therefore, it can conclude that it is no 
multi-colinearity problem in our sample data. 
 
5.2.1.2 Heteroscedasticity problem 
 
The assumption of heteroscedasticity which means the variance of the 
errors is constant ( var (u)  ı2) is made in the standard regression (Hill R. 
C. et. al.,2012). If the sample data has heteroscedasticity problem, the OLS 
estimators will be unbiased. Therefore, it needs to test the assumption for 
our sample data. In this study, the Breusch-Pagan test will be applied and 
the results are as follows, 
 
The null hypothesis: H0: the sample data has constant variance 
The alternative hypothesis: H1: the sample data does not have constant 
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variance 
 
 LTD STD 
P-value 0.0296 0.0000 
TABLE 8: The result from Breusch-Pagan test 
 
The above p-values indicate that both of the two leverages are not 
significant at 5% and 1% confidence level, respectively. It means that both 
of them have to reject the null hypothesis and hence, both of the two 
leverages have heteroscedasticity problem. The results show that the 
standard regression is not appreciated for the sample data. Hence, it needs 
to estimate the regressions by using heteroscedasticity-constant standard 
error estimates which are present by White (White H., 1980). The following 
pooled model is applied this method. 
 
5.2.1.3 F-test for pooled OLS and Fixed effects model 
 
Since it can apply the heteroscedasticity-constant standard error estimates 
in pooled OLS, it also needs to consider that heteroscedasticity has to be 
controlled in the fixed effects model. As Hill et. al. (2008) state, the F-test is 
used to determine which model is more appropriate (Hill et. al., 2008). The 
results are as follows, 
 
The null hypothesis: H0: Pooled OLS is appropriate 
The alternative hypothesis: H1: Fixed effects model is appropriate 
 
 LTD STD 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 
TABLE 9: The result from F-test 
 
From the above table 9, it is easy to see that both of the p-values are 
significant. It means that the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 5 % 
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confidence level. Therefore, the fixed effects model is appropriate for both 
long term leverage and short term leverage.  
 
5.2.1.4 Breusch-Pagan LM test for pooled OLS and Random 
effects model 
 
The difference between pooled OLS and Random effects model is that it 
considers individual heteroscedasticity exists in the Random effects model 
while pooled OLS is not (Chris B., 2008). The Breusch-Pagan LM test is 
aimed to test which model is more suitable. The results are as follows: 
 
The null hypothesis: H0: the variance of individual effect is zero; it means 
that the pooled OLS is suitable  
The alternative hypothesis: H1: the variance of individual effect is positive; it 
means that the Random effects model is suitable 
 
 LTD STD 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 
TABLE 10: The result from Breusch-Pagan LM test 
 
The results show that it can reject the null hypothesis at the 5 % confidence 
level as the p-value is very significant. In other words, the variance of 
individual effect is positive and the Random effects model is more 
appropriate for both long term leverage and short term leverage. 
 
5.2.1.5 Hausman Test for Fixed effects model and Random 
effects model 
 
In Hausman test, it is going to distinguish which model is better for the 
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sample data. The aim of Hausman test is to find out whether there is any 
correlation relationship between individual effects as defined by Hill (Hill et. 
al., 208). The results are as follows, 
 
The null hypothesis: H0 ,QGLYLGXDOV¶ HIIHFWV DQG UHJUHVVRUV DUH QRW
correlated; it means that the Random effects model is better 
The alternative hypothesis: H1 ,QGLYLGXDOV¶ HIIHFWV DQG UHJUHVVRUV DUH
correlated; it means that the fixed effects model is better 
 
 LTD STD 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 
TABLE 11: The result from Hausman Test 
 
From the above table, it can clear to conclude that it can reject the null 
hypothesis at the 5 % confidence level. It means that the Fixed effects 
model is more appropriate than the Random effects model in the sample 
data.  
 
5.2.2 Analysis of Japanese firmV¶ capital structure 
determinants of the fixed effects model 
 
From the front part, it concludes that the Fixed effects model is the most 
appropriate. The results are shown as follows table 12: 
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 LTD STD 
NDTS (Non-debt tax 
shields) 
1.265751 (0.000) 0.3215141 (0.008) 
SIZE (Size) 0.0000133 (0.970) -0.0014557 (0.000) 
GRO (Growth 
opportunities) 
-0.0027297 (0.000) 0.0003501 (0.520) 
TA (Tangible assets) 0.0152803 (0.742) -0.0309735 (0.414) 
LIQUIDITY (Liquidity) -5.23e-06 (0.264) 8.59e-07 (0.823) 
PRO (Profitbility) -0.320413 (0.000) -0.0067361 (0.833) 
Constant 0.1425222 (0.000) 0.1149265 (0.000) 
Fixed effects 0.11343833 0.27240579 
R2 0.1750 0.0351 
Number of observations 1365 1365 
TABLE 12: The result of fixed effects model 
 
According to the results, it shows that some of the determinants have 
significant impact on capital structure in the sample data from Japanese 
firms. However, from the R2 which are 0.1750 in LTD and 0.0351 in STD, the 
regression models have a low confidence level. In additions, some of the 
factors cannot be one of the determinants in capital structure because the 
p-values are very low among the long term leverage and the short term 
leverage. It is trying to explain and find a reason for these results below. 
 
5.2.2.1 Non-debt tax shields (NDTS) 
 
The coefficients of NDTS are 1.265751 and 0.3215141, respectively. Both of 
the coefficients are significant at 5% confidence level in the model because 
of the p-values. It means that it has a positive relationship between 
non-debt tax shield and long or short term leverage. The results are the 
VDPHDV6FRWWDQG0RRUH¶VILQGLQJV6FRWW-0RRUH7:7KH
significant increase in long and short term leverage can be explained that 
the long term debt can bring significant advantages from non-debt tax 
shields. If the firms in Japan have enough taxable income, the taxable 
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income can support the firms with a large amount of debt. The non-debt tax 
shield can reduce the tax from the corporate income due to the tax system. 
Therefore, the taxable income increases. According the pecking order theory, 
the firms prefer to retained earnings than outside financing and debt than 
equity. Moreover, the firms with more debt can have more taxable income 
due to the non-debt tax shields. As Scott and Moore explained, it can 
confirm that it is a positive relationship between NDTS and long/short term 
debt in Japanese firms.  
 
5.2.2.2 Size (SIZE) 
 
Unlike the NDTS, the SIZE has two different relationships in the long term 
leverage and short term leverage. In the long term leverage, it has a positive 
relationship between size and leverage. However, the outcome is not 
significant due to the p-value. It has a lower power in explaining the 
determination of capital structure. On the other hand, in the short term 
leverage, it has a negative relationship between size and leverage. The 
outcome is significant. Both of the relationships are put forward by different 
researchers.  
 
In the view of Warner and Ang, Chua, and McConnell, they point out it is a 
positive relationship (Warner J., 1977, Ang C. K. et. al., 1985). Even though 
the result of long term leverage is not very significant, it still has some 
powerful explaining. According to the trade-off theory, the bankruptcy cost 
will impact the capital structure. Large firms have more capacities to suffer 
from bankruptcy cost than small size firms. It means that in long term debt, 
large size Japanese firms will tend to borrow more debt. In other words, it 
has a positive relationship between size and long term debt. However, from 
6PLWK¶V perspective, it has a negative relationship. The result in short term 
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debt has the same finding. In the view of the pecking order theory, large size 
firms prefer to retained earning firstly. In addition, large size firms have the 
motivation to use their own retained earnings due to they tend to have more 
profitability. Therefore, the large size firms will not borrow too much debt 
from outside market. The result in Japanese firms means that the large size 
firm will not borrow more short term debt than small size firms. In short 
term debt, it has a negative relationship between size and short term debt. 
 
5.2.2.3 Growth opportunity (GRO) 
 
The coefficients of growth opportunity show that it has a negative 
relationship both in long term leverage and short term leverage with growth 
opportunity. However, it is only significant at 5% confidence level in long 
term leverage while it is not significant in short term debt. However, the 
results are the same as the findings from Lang, Ofek, and StulZ (Lang L. E. 
et. al., 1996).  
 
The results from Japanese firms are supported in the trade-off theory. In the 
trade-off theory, growth opportunity in firms will cause agency cost. 
Managers have conflicts with shareholders with growth opportunity for a 
firm. Mangers would like to have a good investment as soon as possible 
while shareholders tend to have flexible alternative of further investment. 
Therefore, it has an agency problem. The agency cost will reduce when 
issuing debt. Moreover, as Myers explained in bankruptcy cost, they tend to 
have less debt since these firms have fewer tangible assets. They are facing 
the bankruptcy risk if they finance their capital structure with much debt. 
Hence, these firms with much growth opportunity will tend to make use of 
debt. In Japanese firms, they may also suffer from the agency cost and 
bankruptcy risk so that they would not like to make use of debt.  
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In conclusion, although the short term leverage is not very significant, it has 
a negative relationship between growth opportunity and long term leverage 
in Japanese firms. 
 
5.2.2.4 Tangible assets (TA) 
 
The coefficients have conflict in long term leverage and short term leverage. 
In long term leverage, the coefficient is 0.0152803 which is positive while 
the coefficient is -0.0309735 which is negative in short term leverage. 
However, both of the coefficients are not significant in the model. It means 
that the tangible assets have very small power in explaining the capital 
structure of Japanese firms. However, in the previous empirical research, it 
should be a determination of capital structure. According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Scott (1972)0\HUVDQG0DMXI¶V (1984) research, it should 
be a positive relationship between tangible assets and leverage (Jensen M. 
et. al., 1976, Scott J., 1972, Myers S. et. al., 1984). The long term leverage 
can explain this relationship although it is very weak. In the trade-off theory, 
the researchers explain that the positive relationship is due to the agency 
cost. Since firms issue debt for the investment in the market, it will shift the 
risk from creditors to shareholders. In addition, shareholders would not 
accept too much debt because of the risk. Hence, it is an agency problem 
between managers and shareholders. That causes the agency cost of debt. 
However, tangible assets can overcome the agency cost because the risk can 
be reduced. Moreover, the pecking order theory provides the same 
relationship between long term debt and tangible assets. Myers and Majluf 
(1984) explain that in the light of asymmetric information costs (Myers S. et. 
al., 1984). The managers can access inside information easier than outside 
investors. An advantage exists in such opportunity. Firms can issue more 
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debt since the cost of issuing debt can avoid the asymmetric information 
costs.  
 
2QWKHRWKHUKDQGDFFRUGLQJWR*URVVPDQDQG+DUW¶V (1982)  view, it is a 
negative relationship (Grossman J. et. al., 1982). The short term debt can 
also explain even though it is weak too. In the light of bankruptcy costs, the 
tangible assets can give enough confidence to shareholders. Hence, 
shareholders are afraid to face the bankruptcy risk. That will cause lower 
debt in a firm.  
 
Although our results cannot be good evidence, it can still consider this factor 
as a determination of capital structure according to empirical research such 
as Jensen and Meckling, Scott, Myers and Majuf (Jensen M. et. al., 1976, 
Scott J., 1972, Myers S. et. al., 1984).  
 
5.2.2.5 Liquidity (LIQUIDITY) 
 
From this factor, tangible assets, the results of liquidity have the same 
situation. It has a conflict in long term leverage and short term leverage as 
the different coefficients. The coefficient of long term leverage is negative 
while the coefficient of short term leverage is positive. Besides, the results 
are not significant as tangible assets, too.  
 
The coefficients are quite not significant from the results since the 
estimators are too small. The liquidity might not have enough power to 
explain the capital structure of Japanese firms as a determination. According 
to empirical researches, there exist two relationships between leverage and 
liquidity from different theories. It is the same as the results. According to 
2]NDQ¶V (2001) empirical research, it provides a positive relationship 
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between liquidity and short term debt (Ozkan A., 2001). Firms with high 
liquidity have motivation to borrow more debt since they can repay the loan 
to creditors. Especially, in short term debt, companies can have a large 
amount of cash flow as they borrow short term debt and then repay the loan. 
Therefore, firms can enlarge their market with enough funds. It is consistent 
with the positive relationship between short term debt and liquidity in the 
trade-off theory. On the other side, Ozkan (2001) also argues a negative 
relationship between long term debt and liquidity (Ozkan A., 2001). 
According to the pecking order theory, firms prefer their own retained 
earnings in the first place. Firms with high liquidity would prefer their 
retained earnings if it is enough. Hence, firms would not have motivation to 
borrow more debt. The negative relationship between long term debt and 
liquidity is consistent with the result in the light of pecking order theory. 
 
5.2.2.6 Profitability (PRO) 
 
Profitability factor is significant in the long term debt which the coefficient is 
-0.320413 whereas it is not significant in the short term debt which the 
coefficient is -0.0067361. Although it is not significant in the short term debt, 
they have the same trend between leverage and profitability. The 
relationship between leverage and profitability is negative in Japanese firms. 
In other words, the Japanese firms are implied the pecking order theory is 
significant in explaining the negative relationship. According to Myers and 
0DMOXI¶V(1984) view, it has a negative relationship between profitability and 
leverage as the pecking order hypothesis (Myers S. et. al., 1984). The 
asymmetric information exists between managers and investor. This 
problem will be costly and if firms finance their fund with retained earnings, 
they can avoid the cost of asymmetric information problem. In the results, it 
shows that Japanese firms would prefer internal finance than external 
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finance if it is enough funds for firms to invest in their project. Hence, it has 
a negative relationship between leverage and profitability in Japanese firms. 
 
6. Conclusion and Research limitations 
6.1 Conclusion 
 
This dissertation is trying to figure out three main issues which are put 
forward in the beginning. Firstly, it attempts to find out what the 
determinants are significant in capital structure with sample data from 
Japanese companies in the NIKKIE 225 index. Secondly, it is using different 
leverage ratios across different industries in Japan to explain how the 
determinants impact the capital structure. Furthermore, it is to discuss 
which theory is most relevant to explain the approach of financing fund in 
Japanese firms from NIKKIE 225 index. The analysis of this study is basic on 
financial Econometrics process. The sample data is collected from a panel 
data set of 193 non-financial firms in the NIKKIE 225 index from 2003 to 
2013 which included 10 year period. The six determinants set by this study 
are provided by previous empirical researches, which are non-debt tax 
VKLHOGV ILUPV¶ VL]H DQG JURZWK RSSRUWXQLW\ WDQJLEOH DVVHWV LQ ILUPV
liquidity ratio and profitability. In addition, the industry classification is also 
a determination to affect the capital structure. The analysis finds out the 
relationship between all the determinants and different leverage ratios in 
order to find out the answer of the three issues. 
 
In the beginning of this study, the one way ANOVA analysis is applied to find 
out whether the industry classification determination is significant in 
affecting the capital structure of Japanese firms or not. The finding of this 
study indicates that the classification determination is one of significant 
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determinants of capital structure in Japanese firms. It is consist with the 
previous studies which put forward by Rjan and Zingales, Myers and Haris 
and Ravis, William and so on (Rajan R. G. et. al., 1995, Myers S., 1984, Haris 
M. et. al., 1991, William L. M. et. al., 2007). The one way ANOVA analysis 
shows that different industries have different performance in the different 
approaches of financing funds. In the view of long term debt, customer 
services and utilities have a more significant high long term debt than other 
industries which can be explained by the trade-off theory. On the other hand, 
in the view of short term debt, industry and basic material have negative 
behaviour with short term debt finance. The reason of such negative 
relationship can be explained by the pecking order theory. Moreover, firms 
with more intangible asset would like to finance their funds by using internal 
finance. It means that firms with more intangible asset such as health care 
would like to have less than other industries both in long term debt and short 
term debt. 
 
Moreover, it is to apply Fixed effects models which are the most suitable 
model for our sample data to discuss the determinants of capital structure. 
The results from Fixed effects models show that some determinants have 
significant impact on decision of capital structure. And there are different 
trends between long term debt and short term debt according to different 
determinants. The results are summarized as follows: 
 
Non-debt tax shields are a significant determination both in long term debt 
and short term debt. It is trustable that there is a positive relationship 
between two kinds of leverages and non-debt tax shields. Its effects are 
consistent with one aspect of the pecking order theory. However, it still has 
argued in pecking order theory for the negative relationship. It is still not 
convinced of the relationship between leverages and non-debt tax shields. 
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The size of the firm only has influence in short term debt and it is not 
significant in long term debt. The negative relationship means that large size 
firms will tend to have less debt while small size firms will have more debt. 
The reason might be explained in the pecking order theory. Firms prefer 
internal finance than external finance. Moreover, large firms have enough 
retained earnings to invest in their project. They prefer internal finance in 
the first place to avoid the cost of debt.  
 
Growth opportunity can be a good determination for both long term debt 
and short term debt. It has a consistent negative relationship with capital 
structure. It means that firms with a good growth opportunity would like to 
have less debt. The finding is consistent with the trade-off theory. The 
reason explained in the trade-off theory might cause from agency cost and 
bankruptcy cost. 
 
Tangible assets have a small power in explaining the capital structure as one 
of determinants. Although tangible assets are too weak in explaining the 
capital structure, it still needs to be considered as one of the determinants. 
The long term debt has positive relationship which is consistent with the one 
explained by the trade-off theory and pecking order theory. Moreover, the 
trade-off theory explains the negative relationship between short term debt 
and tangible assets. Therefore, it can conclude that the trade-off theory is 
more suitable to explain how tangible assets affect the capital structure in 
Japanese firms. 
 
Liquidity has a very low power in explaining the capital structure as a 
determination. The small number of estimated coefficients cannot be very 
trustable. It still needs more evidences to test this factor. However, 
according to many empirical researches, liquidity should consider having a 
positive relationship in the light of the trade-off theory. Moreover, the 
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negative relationship exists in the pecking order theory. Therefore, it still 
needs more argument in this determination. 
 
Profitability has an ability to explain as determination of capital structure in 
long term debt. It has a negative relationship between long term debts with 
profitability which is consistent with the results from the pecking order 
theory. The reason might due to asymmetric information problem so that 
firms would not like to finance with debt. Firms prefer internal finance than 
external finance in order to avoid the cost of the asymmetric information 
problem. Therefore, it supports the pecking order theory with this result. 
 
Through this dissertation, it cannot have a convincing theory to explain the 
behaviour of financing capital structure of Japanese firms because the 
results are quite mixed from the model. However, the trade-off theory plays 
DPRUHLPSRUWDQWUROHLQILUPV¶GHFLVLRQRIFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUH7KHWUDGH-off 
theory is focused on agency cost and especially, cost of financial distress. In 
Japanese history, firms in Japan are more dependent on the bank. They are 
more likely to raise their funds from the bank. This behaviour of financing 
funds might cause agency problems between managers and shareholders. 
Moreover, firms are potential to face bankruptcy risk. Both of these two 
reasons are discussed mainly in the trade-off theory. It might be the reason 
why the trade-RIIWKHRU\LVVXLWDEOHWKHRU\WRH[SODLQWKH-DSDQHVHILUPV¶
behaviour of financing capital structure. Furthermore, it is also supported by 
some results found in this study, such as a growth opportunity and tangible 
DVVHWV+RZHYHU LW LV QRW WKH EHVW WKHRU\ WR H[SODLQ WKH ILUPV¶ financial 
behaviour because the trade-off theory cannot explain all the determinants 
of capital structure. It still needs a further argument to find out an optimal 
theory to explain the capital structure of Japanese firms. 
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6.2 Research limitation 
 
In this dissertation, it is trying to use a sample data from Japanese firms in 
the NIKKIE 225 index during the periods from 2003 to 2013. And it is also 
using some sensitive tests and models to test this sample data. However, it 
is still some limitations similar to previous empirical researches. 
 
Although the sample data used in this study is trying to cover the most of 
Japanese companies and covering 9 non-financial industries, it is not 
considering the large number of private firms. It means that the large 
number of private firms may play an important role in this topic which is the 
determinants of capital structure. However, in order to get steady and 
constant figures, it ignored such large number of figures. Considering this 
case, bias might increase because the sample data cannot represent all of 
the companies in Japan. 
 
Moreover, as the previous empirical researches, there are many different 
proxies for the variables. There might have potential problem with imperfect 
proxies of variables in this study. In this study, the variables are expressed 
as a direct ratio in order to reduce the multi-collinearity problem. However, 
the imperfect proxies of variables may reduce the confidence level of the 
model so that it may be no significant result. In brief, the imperfect proxies 
of variables will need to be improved in the future in the research. In 
addition, the macro factors such as GDP, inflation and interest rate, are not 
investigated in this study. It is believable that the macro factors might have 
VRPHLPSDFWVLQILUPV¶ILQDQFHbehaviour. Hence, this problem also needs to 
be improved in the future study. 
 
Finally, even though this study is recommended to use quantitative analysis 
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mainly, it lacks of some qualitative methods to improve the confidence level 
of the determinants of capital structure. In order to under the behaviour of 
firms in financing their capital structure, it is recommended to adopt the 
survey method. The survey method can explain how managers and 
shareholders are toward debt finance. However, it might not be obvious 
evidence comparing with quantitative approach. Hence, it still needs an 
argument to adopt both quantitative and qualitative approaches in the 
future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
70 
 
References 
$JJDUZDO5DQG.\DZ1$  µ&DSLWDO VWUXFWXUHGLYLGHQGSROLF\DQG
PXOWLQDWLRQOLW\ 7KHRU\ YHUVXV HPSLULFDO HYLGHQFH¶ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO Review of 
Financial Analysis, Vol. 19, pp. 140-150 
 
$QJ-6DQG-XQJ0µ$QDOWHUQDWLYHWHVWRI0\HUV¶SHFNLQJRUGHUWKHRU\
RI FDSLWDO VWUXFWXUH 7KH FDVH RI 6RXWK .RUHDQ ILUPV¶ 3DFLILF-Basin Finance 
Journal, Vol. 1, NO. 1 pp. 31-46 
 
Ang J., ChuD-DQG0F&RQQHOO-µ7KHDGPLQLVWUDWLYHFRVWVRIFRUSRUDWH
%DQNUXSWF\$QRWH¶7KH-RXUQDORI)LQDQFH9RO12SS-226 
 
Armitage S. (2005), The Cost of Capital, Intermediate Theory, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 
 
Baltagi B. H. (2001), Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, John Wikey and Sons, 
New York 
 
%DQFHO ) DQG 0LWWRR 8 5  µ&URVV-country determinants of capital 
VWUXFWXUHFKRLFH$VXUYH\RI(XURSHDQILUPV¶)LQDQFLDO0DQDJHPHQW9RO
pp. 103-132 
 
Barclay M. J. SPLWK&:DQG:DWWV5/µ7KHGHWHUPLQDQWVRIFRUSRUDWH
OHYHUDJHDQGGLYLGHQGSROLF\¶7KH-RXUQDORI$SSOLHG&RUSRUDWH)LQDQFH9RO
NO. 4 pp. 4-19 
 
%DUFOD\0-6PLWK&:DQG0RUHOOHF( µ2QWKH'HEW&DSDFLW\RI
*URZWK2SWLRQV¶ The Journal of Business, Vol. 79, NO. 1 pp. 37-59 
 
%DUWRQ6 /DQG*RUGRQ3 -  µ&RUSRUDWH6WUDWHJ\DQG&DSLWDO¶ 7KH
Journal of Finance, Vol. 22, NO. 3 pp. 395-403 
 
%HQQHWW0 DQG'RQQHOW\5  µ7KHGHWHUPLQDQWV RI FDSLWDO VWUXFWXUH
some 8.HYLGHQFH¶%ULWLVK$FFRXQWLQJ5HYLHZ9ROSS-59 
 
%HYDQ$$DQG'DQEROW-µ&DSLWDOVWUXFWXUHDQGLWVGHWHUPLQDQWVLQWKH
UK ± a de-FRPSRVLWLRQDODQDO\VLV¶$SSOLHG)LQDQFLDO(FRQRPLFV9RO12
pp. 159-170 
 
Booth L. Aivazian V. Demirguc-.XQW $ DQG 0DNVLPRYLF 9  µ&DSLWDO
6WUXFWXUHVLQ'HYHORSLQJ&RXQWULHV¶7KH-RXUQDORI)LQDQFH9ROSS-130 
 
71 
 
%RTXLVW-$DQG0RRUH/$µ,QWHU-industry leverage differences and 
the DeAngelo-0DVXOLVWD[VKLHOGK\SRWKHVLV¶, Financial Management, Vol. 1, pp. 
5-9 
 
Brealey R. A., Myers S. C. and Allen F. (2006), Principles of Corporate Finance, 
8th Ed, McGraw Hill, New York 
 
%UHQQDQ 0 DQG .UDXV $  µ (IILFLHQW )LQDQFLQJ 8QGHU $V\PPHWULF
,QIRUPDWLRQ¶7KH-RXUQDORI)LQDnce, Vol. 42 
 
Chris B. (2008), Introductory Econometrics for Finance, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 
 
&KXQJ . +  µ$VVHW FKDUDFWHULVWLFV DQG FRUSRUDWH GHEW SROLF\ DQ
(PSLULFDOWHVW¶7KH  
 
'H$QJHOR+DQG0DVXOLV5µ2SWLPDO&DSLWDO Structure under Corporate 
DQG3HUVRQDO7D[DWLRQ¶7KH-RXUQDORI)LQDQFLDO(FRQRPLFV9ROSS-29 
 
'LDPRQG : '  µ'HEW PDWXULW\ VWUXFWXUH DQG OLTXLGLW\ ULVN¶ 7KH
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol 106, NO. 3 pp. 709-737 
 
Fama E. and French .µ7HVWLQJWUDGH-off and pecking order predications 
DERXWGLYLGHQGVDQGGHEW¶5HYLHZRI)LQDQFLDO6WXGLHV9ROSS-33 
 
)DPD()µ$JHQF\3UREOHPVDQGWKH7KHRU\RIWKH)LUP¶7KH-RXUQDORI
Political Economy, Vol. 88, NO. 2 pp. 288-307 
 
Fischer E., Heinkel R. and Zechner H. (1989), Dynamic Capital Structure Choice: 
Theory and Tests, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 44 NO. 1 pp. 217-248 
 
)UDQN0=DQG*R\DO9.µ7HVWLQJWKHSHFNLQJRUGHUWKHRU\RIFDSLWDO
VWUXFWXUH¶7KH-RXrnal of Financial Economics, Vol. 63, pp. 217-248 
 
)UDQN0=DQG*R\DO9.µ7UDGH-off and Pecking Order Theories of 
'HEW¶ SURFHHGLQJV RI 8QLYHUVLW\ RI 0LQQHVRWD DQG +RQJ .RQJ 8QLYHUVLW\ RI
Science and Technology 
 
*UDKDP -  µ7D[HV DQG &RUSRUDWH )LQDQFH $ UHYLHZ¶ 7KH UHYLHZ RI
financial studies, Vol. 16, NO. 4 pp. 1075-1129 
 
*URVVPDQ-DQG+DUW2µ&RUSRUDWH)LQDQFLDO6WUXFWXUHDQG0DQDJHULDO
,QFHQWLYHV¶7KH(FRQRPLFVRI,QIRUPDWLRQDQG8QFHUWDLQW\SS-104 
 
72 
 
Grossman S. anG+DU2µ&RUSRUDWHILQDQFLDOVWUXFWXUHDQGPDQDJHULDO
LQFHQWLYH¶7KHHFRQRPLFVRILQIRUPDWLRQDQGXQFHUWDLQW\&KLFDJR8QLYHUVLW\RI
Chicago Press 
 
Gujarati and Porter (2009), Basic Econometrics 5th Ed, McGraw Hill 
 
Gujarati and Porter (2009), Basic Econometrics, 5th Ed, McGraw Hill 
 
+DUULV0DQG5DYLY$ µ&DSLWDOVWUXFWXUHDQGWKHLQIRUPDWLRQUROHRI
GHEW¶7KH-RXUQDORI)LQDQFH9ROSS-349 
 
+DUULV0DQG5DYLY$µ7KH7KHRU\RI&DSLWDO6WUXFWXUH¶7KH-RXUQDORI
Finance, Vol. 46, NO. 1 pp. 297-355 
 
+DXJHQ5$DQG6HQEHW/0µ&RUSRUDWH)LQDQFLDODQG7D[HV¶$5HYLHZ
Financial Management, Vol. 15, NO.3 pp. 5-32 
 
+D\QH(/µ$JHQF\&RVWV5LVN0DQDJHPHQWDQG&DSLWDO6WUXFWXUH¶
The Journal of Finance, Vol. 53, NO, 4, pp. 1213-1243 
 
Hill R. C. Griffiths W. l. and Lim G. C. (2012), Principles of Econometrics, John 
Wiley and Sons, Asia 
 
+VLDR&µ%HQHILWVDQG/LPLWDWLRQVRI3DQHO'DWD¶(FRQRPHWULF5HYLHZ
Vol. 4, pp. 121-174 
 
Hsiao C. (2003), Analysis of Panel Data, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
 
+XDQJ * DQG 6RQJ ) 0  µ7KH GHWHUPLQDQWV RI FDSLWDO VWUXFWXUH
(YLGHQFHIURP&KLQD¶3URFHHGLQJVRI&KLQD(FRQRPLF5HYLHZ1RUWK-Holland, pp. 
14-36 
 
-HQVHQ06µ$JHQF\Sroblems of free cash flow, corporate finance and 
WDNHRYHUV¶$PHULFDQ(FRQRPLF5HYLHZ9RO12SS-329 
 
Jonathan B. and Peter D. (2011), Corporate Finance, Prentice Hall, Boston 
 
Jonathan B. B. and Paul J. M. (1997), A History of Corporate Finance, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, Journal of business finance and accounting, Vol. 
20, NO. 1 pp. 83-98 
 
.DUDGHQL](6.DQGLU<%DOFLODU0DQG2QDO<%µ'HWHUPLQDQWVRI
FDSLWDO VWUXFWXUH HYLGHQFH IURP 7XUNLVK ORGLQJ FRPSDQLHV¶ ,QWernational 
Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management, Vol. 21, NO. 5 pp. 594-609 
73 
 
 
.UDXV$DQG/L]HQEHUJHU5+µ$VWDWH-Preference Model of Optimal 
)LQDQFLDO/HYHUDJH¶7KH-RXUQDORI)LQDQFH9RO12SS-922 
 
Miguel A. and Pindadp -  µ'HWHUPLQDQWV RI FDSLWDO VWUXFWXUH QHZ
HYLGHQFHIURP6SDQLVKSDQHOGDWD¶7KH-RXUQDORIFRUSRUDWH)LQDQFH9ROSS
77-99 
 
0RGLJLODQL)DQG0LOOHU0 µ&RUSRUDWH,QFRPH7D[HVDQGWKH&RVWRI
&DSLWDO$&RUUHFWLRQ¶7KH$PHULFDQ(FRnomic Review, Vol. 53, pp. 433-443 
 
0RGLJLOLDQL)DQG0LOOHU0µ7KH&RVWRI&DSLWDO&RUSRUDWH)LQDQFHDQG
7KH7KHRU\RI,QYHVWPHQW¶7KH$PHULFDQ(FRQRPLF5HYLHZ9RO1SS- 
216-297 
 
0RRUH7:µ$VVHWFRPSRVLWLRQ%DQNUXSWF\FRVWVDQGWKHILUP¶VFKRLFH
RIFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUH¶7KH4XDUWHUO\5HYLHZRI(FRQRPLFVDQG%XVLQHVV9RO
pp. 4-51 
 
0\HUV 6 &  µ'HWHUPLQDQWV RI &RUSRUDWH %RUURZLQJ¶ 7KH -RXUQDO RI
Financial Economics, Vol. 5, pp. 147-175 
 
0\HUV6&µ7KH&DSLWDO6WUXFWXUH3X]]OH¶7KH-RXUQDORI)LQDQFH9RO
39, pp. 575-592 
 
0\HUV6&µ&DSLWDOVWUXFWXUH¶7KH-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLF3HUVSHFWLYHV
Vol. 15, pp. 81-102 
 
0\HUV 6 & DQG 0DMOXI 1 6  µ&RUSRUDWH )LQDQFLQJ DQG ,QYHVWPHQW
Decisions :KHQ )LUPV +DYH ,QIRUPDWLRQ 7KDW ,QYHVWRUV 'R 1RW +DYH¶ 7KH
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 13, pp. 187-211 
 
2]NDQ$µ'HWHUPLQDQWVRI&DSLWDO6WUXFWXUHDQG$GMXVWPHQWWR/RQJ
5XQ7DUJHW(YLGHQFHIURP8.&RPSDQ\3DQHO'DWD¶7KH-RXUQDORI%usiness 
Finance and Accounting, Vol. 28 pp. 175-198 
 
5DMDQ5*DQG=LQJDOHV/µ:KDW'R:H.QRZDERXW&DSLWDO6WUXFWXUH"
6RPH(YLGHQFHIURP,QWHUQDWLRQDO'DWD¶7KH-RXUQDORI)LQDQFH9RO12
pp. 1421-1460 
 
Richard A. B., Myers S. C. and Franklin A. (2008), Principles of Corporate 
Finance, McGraw-Hill, New York 
 
5RVV 6 $  µ7KH 'HWHUPLQDWLRQ RI )LQDQFLDO 6WUXFWXUH 7KH
74 
 
Incentive-6LJQDOOLQJ$SSURDFK¶7KH%HOO-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFV9RO12SS
23-40 
 
5RVV6$µ'HEWDQG7D[HVDQG8QFHUWDLQW\¶7KH-RXUQDORI)LQDQFH9RO
40, NO.3 pp. 637-657 
 
Ross S. A., Westerfield R. W. and Jaffe J. (2008), Corporate Finance, 8th Ed., 
McGraw-Hill Irwin, New York 
 
Sanjay B., ( 2013), Corporate Finance, University of Nottingham 
 
Scott J+µ$7KHRU\RI2SWLPDO&DSLWDO6WUXFWXUH¶7KH%HOO-RXUQDORI
Economics Vol. 7, NO. 1 pp. 33-54 
 
Shyam-6XQGHU / DQG 0\HUV 6 &  µ7HVWLQJ VWDWLF WUDGHRII DJDLQVW
SHFNLQJRUGHUPRGHOVRIFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUH¶7KH-RXUQDORI)LQDQFLDO(FRQRmics, 
Vol. 51 pp. 219-244 
 
6PLWK&µ2SWLRQ3ULFLQJD5HYLHZ¶7KH-RXUQDORI)LQDQFLDO(FRQRPLFV 
 
6PLWK&DQG:DUQHU-µ2QILQDQFLDOFRQWUDFWLQJ$QDQDO\VLVRIERQG
FRYHQDQWV¶7KH-RXUQDORI)LQDQFLDO(FRQRPLFV9ROSS-161 
 
6PLWK&DQG:DWWV5µ7KHLQYHVWPHQW2SSRUWXQLW\6HWDQG&RUSRUDWH
)LQDQFLQJ 'LYLGHQG DQG &RPSHQVDWLRQ 3ROLFLHV¶ 7KH -RXUQDO RI )LQDQFLDO
economics, Vol. 32, NO. 3 pp. 263-292 
 
6WHLQ)  µ&DSLWDO6WUXFWXUH7KHRULHVDQG(PSLULFDO7HVW$QRYHUYLHZ¶
proceedings of the Trondheim Business School, pp. 129-149  
 
7DJJDUW5$-Uµ$0RGHORI&RUSRUDWH)LQDQFLQJ'HFLVLRQV¶7KH-RXUQDO
of Finance, Vol. 32, NO. 4 pp. 1467-1484 
 
7LWPDQ 6  µ7KH (IIHFW RI &DSLWDO 6WUXFWXUH RQ D ILUP¶V /LTXidation 
'HFLVLRQ¶7KH-RXUQDORI)LQDQFH9ROSS-151 
 
7LWPDQ6DQG:HVVHOV5µ7KH'HWHUPLQDQWVRI&DSLWDO6WUXFWXUH&KRLFH¶
The Journal of Finance, Vol. 53, No. 1 pp. 1-19 
 
:DQHU-%µ%DQNUXSWF\&RVWV6RPH(YLGHQFH¶7KH-Rurnal of Finance, 
Vol. 32, NO. 2 pp. 337-347 
 
:KLWH+µ$+HWHURVNHGDVWLFLW\-cosistent Covariance Matrix Estimator 
DQGD'LUHFW7HVWIRU+HWHURVNHGDVLWLFLW\¶(FRQRPHWULFV9ROSS-838 
75 
 
 
William L. M., Scott B. S. and Lawrence J. G. (2007), Corporate Finance, 
Thomson, Canada 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 
 
Appendices 
 
STATA output 
 
1, summarized statistics  
 
 
2, Result of ANOVA analysis 
2.1 Descriptive industry statistics 
 
2.2 Long term debt with dummy variables 
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2.3 Regression between long term debts with industry dummies 
 
2.4 Short term debt with dummy variables 
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2.5 Regression between short term debts with industry dummies 
 
 
3, Correlation Matrix 
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4, Heteroscedasticity test 
4.1 Tests for long term debt 
 
 
4.2 Tests for short term debt 
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5, Breusch-Pagan LM test: Pooled OLS Model and Random Effect Model 
 
5.1 Tests for long term debt 
 
 
5.2 Tests for short term debt 
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6, Hansuman Test: Fixed Effects Model and Random Effects Model 
 
6.1 Tests for long term debt 
 
 
6.2 Tests for short term debt 
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7, Fixed effect model (F-test is carried out when running fixed effect model and 
is presented in the last line) 
 
7.1 Long term debt 
 
 
7.2 short term debt 
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Table 
 
TABLE 1: The summary of industry characteristics 
Industry Frequency Percentage 
Consumer Goods 416 21.99 
Oil & Gas 16 0.85 
Industrials 659 34.83 
Consumer Services 201 10.62 
Basic Materials 277 14.64 
Technology 139 7.35 
Health Care 94 4.97 
Telecommunications 40 2.11 
Utilities 50 2.64 
Total 1892 100 
 
 
TABLE 2: The summary of Independent variables 
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Independent 
variables 
Observation Mean Standard 
deviation 
NDTS 1892 0.0436582 0.223078 
SIZE 1892 9.541216 7.162113 
GRO 1892 4.865682 3.180465 
TA 1892 0.344286 0.1795787 
LIQUIDITY 1365 61.56938 345.7952 
PRO 1892 0.0610392 0.0609237 
 
 
TABLE 3: The summary of dependent variables 
Dependent 
variable 
Observation Mean Standard 
deviation 
LTD 1892 0.1750851 0.1280496 
STD 1892 0.1133681 0.0861607 
 
 
TABLE 4: Results of ANOVA 
Type of leverage F value Prob > F (p value) 
Long term debt leverage 70.28 0.0000 
Short term debt leverage 23.41 0.0000 
 
 
TABLE 5: The coefficients from ANOVA 
 LTD STD 
Consumer Goods -0.0880672 (0.000) 0.400762 (0.003) 
Oil & Gas -0.1463392 (0.000) -0.0013447 (0.956) 
Industrials -0.0698233 (0.000) 0.0427792 (0.001) 
Consumer Services 0.0525872 (0.000) 0.0149135 (0.001) 
Basic Materials -0.057659 (0.007) 0.0744802 (0.296) 
Technology -0.1215716 (0.002) 0.0066764 (0.000) 
Health Care -0.1593753 (0.000) -0.0369155 (0.651) 
Telecommunications 0 (omitted)) 0 (omitted) 
Utilities 0.1623521 (0.000) 0.0072591 (0.678) 
Constant 0.235789 (0.000) 0.0783305 (0.000) 
R2 0.2299 0.0904 
Number of observations 1892 1892 
 
 
 
TABLE 6: The summary of mean of long term debt and short term debt 
 Mean of LTD Mean of STD 
Consumer Goods 0.14766172 0.11840667 
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Oil & Gas 0.08938979 0.0769855 
Industrials 0.16590568 0.12110968 
Consumer Services 0.28831616 0.09324392 
Basic Materials 0.17596301 0.15281066 
Technology 0.11415731 0.0850069 
Health Care 0.07635366 0.04141493 
Telecommunications 0.2357894 0.07833046 
Utilities 0.39808103 0.08558959 
 
 
 
TABLE 7: The result from multi-colinearity test 
 LTD STD NDTS SIZE GRO TA LIQUIDI
TY 
PRO 
LTD 1.000
0 
       
STD 0.309
3 
1.000
0 
      
NDTS 0.104
3 
0.016
0 
1.000
0 
     
SIZE -0.01
07 
-0.32
71 
0.263
2 
1.000
0 
    
GRO 0.112
5 
-0.01
08 
0.503
3 
00.26
39 
1.000
0 
   
TA 0.542
1 
0.181
0 
0.339
1 
0.223
0 
0.416
8 
1.000
0 
  
LIQUIDI
TY 
-0.09
64 
-0.06
96 
0.010
1 
0.029
2 
0.006
2 
-0.09
03 
1.0000  
PRO -0.32
80 
-0.32
48 
0.010
8 
0.541
4 
0.143
3 
-0.12
73 
0.2282 1.000
0 
 
 
TABLE 8: The result from Breusch-Pagan test 
 LTD STD 
P-value 0.0296 0.0000 
 
 
TABLE 9: The result from F-test 
 LTD STD 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
TABLE 10: The result from Breusch-Pagan LM test 
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 LTD STD 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
TABLE 11: The result from Hausman Test 
 LTD STD 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
TABLE 12: The result of fixed effects model 
 LTD STD 
NDTS 1.265751 (0.000) 0.3215141 (0.008) 
SIZE 0.0000133 (0.970) -0.0014557 (0.000) 
GRO -0.0027297 (0.000) 0.0003501 (0.520) 
TA 0.0152803 (0.742) -0.0309735 (0.414) 
LIQUIDITY -5.23e-06 (0.264) 8.59e-07 (0.823) 
PRO -0.320413 (0.000) -0.0067361 (0.833) 
Constant 0.1425222 (0.000) 0.1149265 (0.000) 
Fixed effects 0.11343833 0.27240579 
R2 0.1750 0.0351 
Number of observations 1365 1365 
 
